On Tue, 2024-04-23 at 09:02 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote: > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked > > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to > > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type > > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant > > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers. > > > > Stefan, > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution: > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution. > > I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM > assertions, > including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode. I have hopefully a better idea. We should detect violations at each level of the stack independently. And IMA should be invoked each time overlayfs uses an underlying layer. That is currently not easy, from the IMA policy perspective, because there are filesystem-specific rules, such as fsname= or fsuuid=. At the moment, I'm not planning to solve this, but I'm thinking to use for example FMODE_BACKING to ignore the filesystem-specific keywords and match the rule anyway. For now, I'm only addressing the call to underlying layers. To make sure that IMA evaluates every layer, I added a rule that checks the inode UID: measure fowner=2000 mask=MAY_READ I just investigated a bit, and I made some changes (for now, I'm just making it work, and you tell me what you think). diff --git a/fs/backing-file.c b/fs/backing-file.c index 740185198db3..8016f62cf770 100644 --- a/fs/backing-file.c +++ b/fs/backing-file.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/backing-file.h> #include <linux/splice.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -40,12 +41,16 @@ struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags, if (IS_ERR(f)) return f; + f->f_mode |= OPEN_FMODE(flags); + path_get(user_path); *backing_file_user_path(f) = *user_path; error = vfs_open(real_path, f); if (error) { fput(f); f = ERR_PTR(error); + } else { + security_file_post_open(f, ACC_MODE(flags)); } return f; Setup: # mount -t overlay -olowerdir=a,upperdir=b,workdir=c overlay d open is a tool with the following syntax: open <path> <perm> It performs the open, and waits for user input before closing the file. ToMToU (Time of Measurement - Time of Use): Same fs (overlayfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 1) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 2) This works: 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/d/test-file This is the result of calling IMA at both layers, and the violation of course happens twice. This is also confirmed in the logs: Apr 23 14:52:45 fedora audit[994]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=994 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Apr 23 14:52:45 fedora audit[994]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=994 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/d/test-file" dev="overlay" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Different fs (overlayfs, btrfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 1) # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file w (terminal 2) Again, this works despite the read is in overlayfs, and the write is in btrfs: 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/b/test-file The difference from the previous example is that now there is only one violation, which is detected only in the upper layer. The logs have: Apr 23 15:01:15 fedora audit[985]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=985 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/b/test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Different fs (btrfs, overlayfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file r (terminal 2) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 d7a692e19158820d2755542a8d31b49ac7ac2729 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/b/test-file 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file Works too. There is only one measurement, since that is done only for the upper layer. Apr 23 15:05:40 fedora audit[982]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=982 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Open writers Same fs (overlayfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 2) 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/d/test-file 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file Apr 23 15:10:46 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Apr 23 15:10:46 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/d/test-file" dev="overlay" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Different fs (overlayfs, btrfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file w (terminal 1) # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file r (terminal 2) 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 /root/test-dir/b/test-file 10 d7a692e19158820d2755542a8d31b49ac7ac2729 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/b/test-file Apr 23 15:12:58 fedora audit[984]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=984 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="/root/test-dir/b/test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Different fs (btrfs, overlayfs) # /root/open /root/test-dir/b/test-file w (terminal 1) # /root/open /root/test-dir/d/test-file r (terminal 2) 10 35435d0858d895b90097306171a2e5fcc7f5da9e ima-ng sha256:0e4acf326a82c6bded9d86f48d272d7a036b6490081bb6466ecc2a0e416b244a boot_aggregate 10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ima-ng sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 test-file 10 cef529d5d1032ffb6d3e2154664c83ba18cf2576 ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 test-file 10 694277487b9753db78446192231b59b7be7c03ad ima-ng sha256:f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2 /root/test-dir/d/test-file Apr 23 15:16:37 fedora audit[983]: INTEGRITY_PCR pid=983 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="open" name="test-file" dev="sda3" ino=995512 res=1 errno=0 Roberto > I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix > the problem. > > Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO. > Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really > needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the > real inode. > I am sorry that we are failing to communicate on this matter, but I am not > sure how else I can help. > > Thanks, > Amir.
