Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@xxxxxxxxxx> writes: > Hi Eric, > > Can you please have a look at this patchset? > > The most interesting one is the last oneliner adding FS_USERNS_MOUNT; > whether I'm correct in stating that this isn't going to introduce any > holes, or not... I will take some time and dig through this. >From a robustness standpoint I worry about the stackable filesystem side. As that is uniquely an attack vector with overlayfs. There is definitely demand for this. > Thanks, > Miklos > > --- > Miklos Szeredi (5): > ovl: document permission model > ovl: ignore failure to copy up unknown xattrs > vfs: allow unprivileged whiteout creation > ovl: user xattr > ovl: unprivieged mounts > > Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt | 44 +++++++++++++ > fs/char_dev.c | 3 + > fs/namei.c | 17 ++--- > fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 34 +++++++--- > fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 2 +- > fs/overlayfs/export.c | 2 +- > fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 39 ++++++------ > fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 56 +++++++++-------- > fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 81 +++++++++++++++--------- > fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 + > fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 5 +- > fs/overlayfs/super.c | 53 +++++++++++----- > fs/overlayfs/util.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++---- > include/linux/device_cgroup.h | 3 + > 14 files changed, 298 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-) Eric
