Hi, On 02. 03. 20, 12:28, Ye Bin wrote: > Fix CVE-2020-8647(https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8647), detail description > about this CVE is in bugzilla "https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206359". this is much better. So this is one of the bugzilla reports... > error information: > BUG: KASan: use after free in vc_do_resize+0x49e/0xb30 at addr ffff88000016b9c0 > Read of size 2 by task syz-executor.3/24164 > page:ffffea0000005ac0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 > page flags: 0xfffff00000000() > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected > CPU: 0 PID: 24164 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 3.10.0-862.14.2.1.x86_64+ #2 > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), > BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 > Call Trace: > [<ffffffffb059f309>] dump_stack+0x1e/0x20 > [<ffffffffaf8af957>] kasan_report+0x577/0x950 > [<ffffffffaf8ae652>] __asan_load2+0x62/0x80 > [<ffffffffafe3728e>] vc_do_resize+0x49e/0xb30 > [<ffffffffafe3795c>] vc_resize+0x3c/0x60 > [<ffffffffafe1d80d>] vt_ioctl+0x16ed/0x2670 > [<ffffffffafe0089a>] tty_ioctl+0x46a/0x1a10 > [<ffffffffaf92db3d>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x5bd/0xc40 > [<ffffffffaf92e2f2>] SyS_ioctl+0x132/0x170 > [<ffffffffb05c9b1b>] system_call_fastpath+0x22/0x27 > > In function vc_do_resize: > ...... > if (vc->vc_y > new_rows) { > ....... > old_origin += first_copied_row * old_row_size; > } else > first_copied_row = 0; > end = old_origin + old_row_size * min(old_rows, new_rows); > ...... > while (old_origin < end) { > scr_memcpyw((unsigned short *) new_origin, > (unsigned short *) old_origin, rlth); > if (rrem) > scr_memsetw((void *)(new_origin + rlth), > vc->vc_video_erase_char, rrem); > old_origin += old_row_size; > new_origin += new_row_size; > } > ...... > > We can see that before calculate variable "end" may update variable "old_origin" > with "old_origin += first_copied_row * old_row_size", variable "end" is equal to > "old_origin + (first_copied_row + min(old_rows, new_rows))* old_row_size", it's > possible that "first_copied_row + min(old_rows, new_rows)" large than "old_rows". > So when call scr_memcpyw function cpoy data from origin buffer to new buffer in > "while" loop, which "old_origin" may large than real old buffer end. Now, we > calculate origin buffer end before update "old_origin" to avoid illegal memory > access. I need to look into the code first. Note to myself, the line was added in: commit 9fc2b2d0cf743008d8f6be6293278f4ef61f09f3 Author: Francisco Jerez <currojerez@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Sun Aug 22 17:37:24 2010 +0200 vt: Fix console corruption on driver hand-over. > Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxxx> You misunderstood me. syzbot, while reporting a bug, amends this to the reports: """ IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: syzbot+SOMETHING@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx """ It is not the case in this case, as this went through bugzilla, not using syzbot. So instead of the Reported-by, we should have: References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206359 here. > Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c > index 8fa059ec6cc8..1d7217bef678 100644 > --- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c > +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c > @@ -1231,6 +1231,7 @@ static int vc_do_resize(struct tty_struct *tty, struct vc_data *vc, > old_origin = vc->vc_origin; > new_origin = (long) newscreen; > new_scr_end = new_origin + new_screen_size; > + end = old_origin + old_row_size * min(old_rows, new_rows); > > if (vc->vc_y > new_rows) { > if (old_rows - vc->vc_y < new_rows) { > @@ -1249,7 +1250,6 @@ static int vc_do_resize(struct tty_struct *tty, struct vc_data *vc, > old_origin += first_copied_row * old_row_size; > } else > first_copied_row = 0; > - end = old_origin + old_row_size * min(old_rows, new_rows); > > vc_uniscr_copy_area(new_uniscr, new_cols, new_rows, > get_vc_uniscr(vc), rlth/2, first_copied_row, > thanks, -- js suse labs