Re: NULL primary_path

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On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 9:05 PM, Karl Heiss <kheiss@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 7:10 PM, Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 03/11/2013 06:44 PM, Karl Heiss wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 5:59 PM, Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@xxxxxxxxx>
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 03/09/2013 03:19 PM, Karl Heiss wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Karl Heiss <kheiss@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 11:42 AM, Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 03/08/2013 10:37 AM, Karl Heiss wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 10:31 AM, Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 03/08/2013 09:31 AM, Karl Heiss wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 8:52 AM, Karl Heiss <kheiss@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 7, 2013 at 6:09 PM, Vlad Yasevich
>>>>>>>>>>> <vyasevich@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 03/07/2013 04:51 PM, Karl Heiss wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 7, 2013 at 12:17 PM, Vlad Yasevich
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <vyasevich@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 03/07/2013 12:06 PM, Karl Heiss wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The issue appears to manifest itself when the connection is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from the remote end and getsockopt(SCTP_STATUS) is called
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> small window in which the association is still valid but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asoc->peer.primary_path is NULL.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Aha!  Thanks.  There was a bug in the rcu clean-up that allowed
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> association to remain while all transports have been removed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here is a patch that should have addressed this condition:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commit 8c98653f05534acd1cb07ea4929702a3659177d1
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Author: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Date:   Fri Feb 1 04:37:43 2013 +0000
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>          sctp: sctp_close: fix release of bindings for deferred
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> call_rcu's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Full patch is here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=8c98653f05534acd1cb07ea4929702a3659177d1
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Make sure that you have this patch in the kernel you are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> running
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -vlad
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately this patch wont apply to the version of the SCTP
>>>>>>>>>>>>> stack
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that we are using (2.6.36.2) since it does not have a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> sctp_transport_destroy_rcu() function.  Is there any chance that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> simply swapping the order of the instructions without moving
>>>>>>>>>>>>> them
>>>>>>>>>>>>> would have any effect?  I ask this hypothetically because the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> race
>>>>>>>>>>>>> condition window seems to be difficult to recreate, thus nothing
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> test against (aside from in the field!).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Karl
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Karl
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I think I see the problem now.  The problem happens when the
>>>>>>>>>>>> association
>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> destroyed.  We delay removing the association from
>>>>>>>>>>>> the association id pool until all references on the association
>>>>>>>>>>>> have dropped.  As a result, it is possible (for a very short
>>>>>>>>>>>> period of time) for an association structure to still exist in
>>>>>>>>>>>> the kernel and still be found via the association id, but that
>>>>>>>>>>>> association
>>>>>>>>>>>> has no transports and is about to be completely destroyed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This is a really interesting race and I need to figure out if it
>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> there on purpose or not?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> In the mean time, here is a patch that should solve it for you.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
>>>>>>>>>>>> index b907073..2d92c89 100644
>>>>>>>>>>>> --- a/net/sctp/socket.c
>>>>>>>>>>>> +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
>>>>>>>>>>>> @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_id2assoc(struct
>>>>>>>>>>>> sock
>>>>>>>>>>>> *sk,
>>>>>>>>>>>> sctp_assoc_t id)
>>>>>>>>>>>>                     if (!list_empty(&sctp_sk(sk)->ep->asocs))
>>>>>>>>>>>>                             asoc =
>>>>>>>>>>>> list_entry(sctp_sk(sk)->ep->asocs.next,
>>>>>>>>>>>>                                               struct
>>>>>>>>>>>> sctp_association,
>>>>>>>>>>>> asocs);
>>>>>>>>>>>> -               return asoc;
>>>>>>>>>>>> +               goto done;
>>>>>>>>>>>>             }
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>             /* Otherwise this is a UDP-style socket. */
>>>>>>>>>>>> @@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_id2assoc(struct
>>>>>>>>>>>> sock
>>>>>>>>>>>> *sk,
>>>>>>>>>>>> sctp_assoc_t id)
>>>>>>>>>>>>             asoc = (struct sctp_association
>>>>>>>>>>>> *)idr_find(&sctp_assocs_id,
>>>>>>>>>>>> (int)id);
>>>>>>>>>>>>             spin_unlock_bh(&sctp_assocs_id_lock);
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> +done:
>>>>>>>>>>>>             if (!asoc || (asoc->base.sk != sk) ||
>>>>>>>>>>>> asoc->base.dead)
>>>>>>>>>>>>                     return NULL;
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Vlad,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Looking at the kdump from the panic, I am seeing that your patch
>>>>>>>>>>> above
>>>>>>>>>>> may not work in this case since the asoc is valid, the base.sk is
>>>>>>>>>>> valid, and base.dead is 0.  Unless base.sk is valid but doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>> match
>>>>>>>>>>> sk, this wouldn't appear to fix this issue.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hm..  If the association is not marked "dead", it should still have
>>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>> transports present.  If you look at the peer.transport_addr_list in
>>>>>>>>> you kdump, is that list empty or not?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Are any other peer transport pointers set (active_path,
>>>>>>>>> retran_path)?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> crash> p ((struct sctp_association *) 0xffff8107670e3000).peer
>>>>>>>> $14 = {
>>>>>>>>      rwnd = 65535,
>>>>>>>>      transport_addr_list = {
>>>>>>>>        next = 0xffff8107670e3180,
>>>>>>>>        prev = 0xffff8107670e3180
>>>>>>>>      },
>>>>>>>>      transport_count = 0,
>>>>>>>>      port = 3868,
>>>>>>>>      primary_path = 0x0,
>>>>>>>>      primary_addr = {
>>>>>>>>        v4 = {
>>>>>>>>          sin_family = 0,
>>>>>>>>          sin_port = 0,
>>>>>>>>          sin_addr = {
>>>>>>>>            s_addr = 0
>>>>>>>>          },
>>>>>>>>          __pad = "\000\000\000\000\000\000\000"
>>>>>>>>        },
>>>>>>>>        v6 = {
>>>>>>>>          sin6_family = 0,
>>>>>>>>          sin6_port = 0,
>>>>>>>>          sin6_flowinfo = 0,
>>>>>>>>          sin6_addr = {
>>>>>>>>            in6_u = {
>>>>>>>>              u6_addr8 =
>>>>>>>> "\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",
>>>>>>>>              u6_addr16 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
>>>>>>>>              u6_addr32 = {0, 0, 0, 0}
>>>>>>>>            }
>>>>>>>>          },
>>>>>>>>          sin6_scope_id = 0
>>>>>>>>        },
>>>>>>>>        sa = {
>>>>>>>>          sa_family = 0,
>>>>>>>>          sa_data =
>>>>>>>> "\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000"
>>>>>>>>        }
>>>>>>>>      },
>>>>>>>>      active_path = 0x0,
>>>>>>>>      retran_path = 0x0,
>>>>>>>>      last_sent_to = 0x0,
>>>>>>>>      last_data_from = 0x0,
>>>>>>>>      tsn_map = {
>>>>>>>>        tsn_map = 0x0,
>>>>>>>>        base_tsn = 0,
>>>>>>>>        cumulative_tsn_ack_point = 0,
>>>>>>>>        max_tsn_seen = 0,
>>>>>>>>        len = 0,
>>>>>>>>        pending_data = 0,
>>>>>>>>        num_dup_tsns = 0,
>>>>>>>>        dup_tsns = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
>>>>>>>>      },
>>>>>>>>      sack_needed = 1 '\001',
>>>>>>>>      sack_cnt = 0,
>>>>>>>>      ecn_capable = 0 '\0',
>>>>>>>>      ipv4_address = 1 '\001',
>>>>>>>>      ipv6_address = 0 '\0',
>>>>>>>>      hostname_address = 0 '\0',
>>>>>>>>      asconf_capable = 0 '\0',
>>>>>>>>      prsctp_capable = 0 '\0',
>>>>>>>>      auth_capable = 0 '\0',
>>>>>>>>      adaptation_ind = 0,
>>>>>>>>      addip_disabled_mask = 0,
>>>>>>>>      i = {
>>>>>>>>        init_tag = 0,
>>>>>>>>        a_rwnd = 0,
>>>>>>>>        num_outbound_streams = 0,
>>>>>>>>        num_inbound_streams = 0,
>>>>>>>>        initial_tsn = 0
>>>>>>>>      },
>>>>>>>>      cookie_len = 0,
>>>>>>>>      cookie = 0x0,
>>>>>>>>      addip_serial = 0,
>>>>>>>>      peer_random = 0x0,
>>>>>>>>      peer_chunks = 0x0,
>>>>>>>>      peer_hmacs = 0x0
>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Karl
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Vlad,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> One other thing, with the difficulty we are having recreating this
>>>>>>>>>> issue, is there any generic way to increase the likelihood for the
>>>>>>>>>> transport to be cleared out while delaying the association cleanup?
>>>>>>>>>> Is there any way that the association is initialized without any
>>>>>>>>>> transport information?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When the association is initialized, the lists are empty, but the
>>>>>>>>> next
>>>>>>>>> thing that happens is that we add transport of the destination we
>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>> sending to or receiving from to the association and mark it as
>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> active.  All this happens under a socket lock, so getsockopt can't
>>>>>>>>> access the association until all actions on that association
>>>>>>>>> complete.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The reason I ask; we believe the issue is
>>>>>>>>>> happening very shortly after the association is brought up (we
>>>>>>>>>> bring
>>>>>>>>>> it up and then do the getsockopt()).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Can you check what the association state is?  Alternately, can you
>>>>>>>>> provide
>>>>>>>>> the kdump and the kernel so I can dig around.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> crash> p ((struct sctp_association *) 0xffff8107670e3000).state
>>>>>>>> $15 = SCTP_STATE_CLOSED
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Karl
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Was this the client or the server side?  Also what was the socket type
>>>>>>> (STREAM or SEQPACKET)?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -vlad
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Thanks
>>>>>>>>> -vlad
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> Karl
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We believe this is occurring on the client side (still working on
>>>>>> confirming, this system is a Diameter router so we get connections
>>>>>> going in both directions).  The connections are all STREAM.  We are
>>>>>> also seeing ABORTs fairly regularly on the connections in suspect.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Karl
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So we finally got a capture around the time of the panic.  The
>>>>> panicing system is acting as a server and the client is connecting,
>>>>> gets through INIT and COOKIE_ECHO, and sends several data packets when
>>>>> the client sends another INIT.  At this point, the server handles the
>>>>> INIT, starts over and it starts sending data packets again when the
>>>>> server sends an ABORT because the application doesn't support
>>>>> restarting the connection.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Do you know if this is done through SO_LINGER or with sendmsg and
>>>> MSG_ABORT?
>>>>
>>>> -vlad
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>   It is around this time that the panic
>>>>> occurs.  One thing that I noticed is that the sctp_association
>>>>> structure looks awfully similar to a temporary association that is
>>>>> created when an unexpected INIT is received, but before it is
>>>>> populated with peer information. However the temp value is not set to
>>>>> 0 as would be expected.
>>>>>
>>>>> Karl
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is done with SO_LINGER.  However, we just were able to reproduce the
>>> issue.
>>>
>>> When a duplicate cookie-echo message is received, and the
>>> sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() => sctp_unpack_cookie() is called, it calls
>>> sctp_association_new() instead of sctp_make_temp_asoc(), and ends up
>>> creating a full-fledged association instead of one with "temp" set.
>>> Now, if we enter collision case, the primary path does not get written
>>> in the association. When the next command is set to SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC,
>>> since the association does not have "temp" marked, it gets added to
>>> the association hash table and the endpoint. Even when the command
>>> SCTP_CMD_DELETE_TCB is processed, since the association is not
>>> temporary, the following check in sctp_cmd_delete_tcb() prevents the
>>> association from being deleted from the hash table or the endpoint.
>>>
>>>                  if (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING) &&
>>>                      (!asoc->temp) && (sk->sk_shutdown != SHUTDOWN_MASK))
>>>                                  return;
>>>
>>>                  sctp_unhash_established(asoc);
>>>       <<< never reached
>>>                  sctp_association_free(asoc);
>>>             <<< never reached
>>>
>>> When we duplicate the traffic using netem, we are able to get this to
>>> occur when getsockopt(SCTP_STATUS) is called due to the transport
>>> being NULL.
>>>
>>> Karl
>>
>>
>> Hi Karl
>>
>> Yep, this is the code I've been looking at as well, just didn't get far
>> enough.  I was focusing the dookcook_a case().
>>
>> I'm attaching a patch (untested) that should fix this.
>>
>> -vlad
>>>
>>>
>>
> Vlad,
>
> That looks promising, however SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC doesn't exist in this
> (2.6.36.2) SCTP stack.  I will look into backporting this side effect
> state or finding an alternate way of preventing the association from
> being added to the endpoint.
>
> Karl

Vlad,

I have another kernel which experiences panics with the same
duplicated SCTP traffic and has a SCTP stack from 3.1.7, to which your
previous patch cleanly applies.  Unfortunately, the panic now occurs
when sctp_unhash_established() is called from sctp_cmd_delete_tcb(),
attempting to delete a node from the association base.

As a test, I attempted the crude method of setting all associations
generated from sctp_unpack_cookie() in sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() to
be temporary associations and we are unable to panic the system.  From
my (somewhat poor) understanding, however, this would break the
behavior described in the RFC for case 'A' and possibly 'B'.  Does it
make sense instead to modify case 'A' and 'B' to alter asoc instead of
new_asoc and leave new_asoc as a temporary association for all cases?

Thanks for the patience and help so far.

Karl
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