Nicolas Kaiser wrote, at 10/21/2010 06:14 PM: > Checking the chunk length at this point appears redundant, as > the rest of the packet gets discarded anyway. > > Signed-off-by: Nicolas Kaiser <nikai@xxxxxxxxx> Yes, indeed. How did you find this? By reviewing the source code? -- Best Regards ----- Shan Wei > --- > net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 6 ------ > 1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > index 4b4eb7c..9840615 100644 > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > @@ -3418,12 +3418,6 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, > > SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS); > > - /* If the chunk length is invalid, we don't want to process > - * the reset of the packet. > - */ > - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) > - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); > - > /* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent > * potential bomming attacks from additional bundled chunks. > * This is documented in SCTP Threats ID. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
