Checking the chunk length at this point appears redundant, as the rest of the packet gets discarded anyway. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Kaiser <nikai@xxxxxxxxx> --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 6 ------ 1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 4b4eb7c..9840615 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -3418,12 +3418,6 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS); - /* If the chunk length is invalid, we don't want to process - * the reset of the packet. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent * potential bomming attacks from additional bundled chunks. * This is documented in SCTP Threats ID. -- 1.7.2.2 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
