Re: [PATCH] remove AND operation in choose_random_kstack_offset()

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On 2024/6/18 18:45, Mark Rutland wrote:
Hi Arnd,

On Mon, Jun 17, 2024 at 10:33:08PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
On Mon, Jun 17, 2024, at 20:22, Kees Cook wrote:
On Mon, Jun 17, 2024 at 04:52:15PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
On Mon, Jun 17, 2024 at 01:37:21PM +0000, Yuntao Liu wrote:
Since the offset would be bitwise ANDed with 0x3FF in
add_random_kstack_offset(), so just remove AND operation here.

Signed-off-by: Yuntao Liu <liuyuntao12@xxxxxxxxxx>

The comments in arm64 and x86 say that they're deliberately capping the
offset at fewer bits than the result of KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX() masking the
value with 0x3FF.

Maybe it's ok to expand that, but if that's the case the commit message
needs to explain why it's safe add extra bits (2 on arm64, 3 on s39 and
x86), and those comments need to be updated accordingly.

As-is, I do not think this patch is ok.

Yeah, I agree: the truncation is intentional and tuned to the
architecture.

It may be intentional, but it's clearly nonsense: there is nothing
inherent to the architecture that means we have can go only 256
bytes instead of 512 bytes into the 16KB available stack space.

As far as I can tell, any code just gets bloated to the point
where it fills up the available memory, regardless of how
much you give it. I'm sure one can find code paths today that
exceed the 16KB, so there is no point pretending that 15.75KB
is somehow safe to use while 15.00KB is not.

I'm definitely in favor of making this less architecture
specific, we just need to pick a good value, and we may well
end up deciding to use less than the default 1KB. We can also
go the opposite way and make the limit 4KB but then increase
the default stack size to 20KB for kernels that enable
randomization.

Sorry, to be clear, I'm happy for this to change, so long as:

* The commit message explains why that's safe.

   IIUC this goes from 511 to 1023 bytes on arm64, which is ~3% of the
   stack, so maybe that is ok. It'd be nice to see any rationale/analysis
   beyond "the offset would be bitwise ANDed with 0x3FF".

* The comments in architecture code referring to the masking get
   removed/updated along with the masking.

My complaint was that the patch didn't do those things.


Sorry for that I don't adjust the comments in architecture code referring to the masking.
I've tested the stack entropy by applying this patch on arm64.
before:
Bits of stack entropy: 6
after:
Bits of stack entropy: 7
It seems the difference was minimal, so I didn't reflect it in the commit message. Now it appears that I missed some of the Kees's intentions.
Kees has resent the patch, and everything should be fine now.

Thanks!
Yuntao

Mark.




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