On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 02:22:38PM +0100, Jonathan Cameron wrote: > On Tue, 9 Jul 2024 15:15:13 -0700 > Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > James Bottomley wrote: > > > > The upstream discussion has yielded the full spectrum of positions on > > > > device specific functionality, and it is a topic that needs cross- > > > > kernel consensus as hardware increasingly spans cross-subsystem > > > > concerns. Please consider it for a Maintainers Summit discussion. > > > > > > I'm with Greg on this ... can you point to some of the contrary > > > positions? > > > > This thread has that discussion: > > > > http://lore.kernel.org/0-v1-9912f1a11620+2a-fwctl_jgg@xxxxxxxxxx > > > > I do not want to speak for others on the saliency of their points, all I > > can say is that the contrary positions have so far not moved me to drop > > consideration of fwctl for CXL. > > I was resisting rat holing. Oh well... > > For a 'subset' of CXL. There are a wide range of controls that are highly > destructive, potentially to other hosts (simplest one is a command that > will surprise remove someone else's memory). I don't know alot of CXL, but from talking with Dan and reading these posts it seems to me that CXL turn into a network, with switches and multi-node and then somehow hid some kind of 'raw packet' interface to communicate node-to-node. But never added any kind of node level authorization? ie trust the nodes not to hurt each other? Sounds sketchy to me :) > So if fwctl is adopted, I do want the means to use it for the highly > destructive stuff as well! Maybe that's a future discussion. With that kind of security model you probably have to trust the userspace, even in a lockdown kernel. ie can userspace replace the CXL HW that has the command interface with VFIO and then do anything with nothing more than CAP_SYS_ADMIN and root? If so it is not unreasonable that a fwctl interface has a similar level of protection. > > Where CXL has a Command Effects Log that is a reasonable protocol for > > making decisions about opaque command codes, and that CXL already has a > > few years of experience with the commands that *do* need a Linux-command > > wrapper. > > Worth asking if this will incorporate unknown but not vendor defined > commands. There is a long tail of stuff in the spec we haven't caught up > with yet. Or you thinking keep this for the strictly vendor defined stuff? I would allow as much as possible in fwctl that meets the defined functional limitations and security model. There is security merit in saying userspace will run, parse and convert to output complex commands if it can safely do so. From an end user perspective running a common tool to view the output is generally always preferred anyhow, and the typical user doesn't really care if the tool trundles through sysfs or does something else. Jason
