On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 11:19:52AM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: [..] > > I am hoping I did not miss your point entirely. > > No, you didn't. If replay attacks are not a concern then that bit > doesn't matter. But if^Wwhen there is a vulnerability in a signed kernel, > and a user has a copy of bzImage sitting around, signed kexec alone does > not suffice (and I'm assuming revocation is not going into the kernel?). > It seems to me if replay attacks are ignored, this is all for theater... > As matthew mentioned, revocation list is in kernel. So old vulnerable kernels should fail signature verification. > The other concern is analogous, just more general - seems like I may very > well be able to find a way to corrupt kexec or even corrupt the kernel with > a bad environment. > > So I'm just saying that in general it doesn't seem worth having a special > list of capabilities that only signed executables can have, without doing > something about the environment. Agreed that only being signed is part of the problem. Environment is important too. And running signed binaries memory locked is I think one part of controlling the environment. But there might be other things too which I am blissfully unaware of. Right now there were few things we were considering for controlling the environemnt. - Build /sbin/kexec statically and sign only statically linked exeutables. - Run executables memory locked - Unsigned binary can not ptrace() signed one. > And that the solution to that seems like > what we can already do today (with a bounding set and init-launched > services). Frankly speaking I did not understand this part. For secureboot issue we don't trust root and don't trust init. I am assuming any restricted environment setup will have to be done by a trusted entity. > > All of this is probably premature though. IIUC the first thing you are > after is a way to record on the file the fact that it is a verified-signature > binary, and that's what CAP_SIGNED meant right? Yes, that was the first thing. How to reliably sign and verify signature of a executable. Also make sure executable code/data can not modified in memory later by anything untrusted. > I agree we need something > like that, but using a capability is not right. You can add a field to > the binprm or file or f_cred, or even add a field to the capability struct, > meaningful only on files, to show it was signed - but not taint the list of > capabilities with something that is not a capability. Ok, I will look into other options too. Agreed being signed is not a capability. But being signed along with other attributes should allow to get one a capability (CAP_MODIFY_KERNEL in this case). I am not sure why nobody likes that idea. But that's fine, I will go with advice of subject matter experts. > I haven't looked > closer to see which would be the best way (my hunch would be binprm), will > be happy to come up with a proposal when I have time, but I don't want to slow > you down :) Any suggetions are greatly appreciated whenever time permits. In the mean time I will atleast write more code and post it for RFC and hopefully there will be some consensus on how to solve kexec issue. Thanks Vivek -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-pci" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
