Hi Alexey,
On Wed, Nov 01, 2023 at 09:56:11AM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> Hi everyone,
>
> Here is followup after the Dan's community call we had weeks ago.
>
> Our (AMD) goal at the moment is TDISP to pass through SRIOV VFs to
> confidential VMs without trusting the HV and with enabled IDE (encryption)
> and IOMMU (performance, compared to current SWIOTLB). I am aware of other
> uses and vendors and I spend hours unsuccessfully trying to generalize all
> this in a meaningful way.
>
> The AMD SEV TIO verbs can be simplified as:
>
> - device_connect - starts CMA/SPDM session, returns measurements/certs, runs
> IDE_KM to program the keys;
> - device_reclaim - undo the connect;
> - tdi_bind - transition the TDI to TDISP's LOCKED and RUN states, generates
> interface report;
>From a VF to TVM use case, I think tdi_bind should only transition to
LOCKED, but not RUN. RUN should only be reached once the TVM approves
the device, and afaiu this is a host call.
> - tdi_unbind - undo the bind;
> - tdi_info - read measurements/certs/interface report;
> - tdi_validate - unlock TDI's MMIO and IOMMU (or invalidate, depends on the
> parameters).
That's equivalent to the TVM accepting the TDI, and this should
transition the TDI from LOCKED to RUN.
> The first 4 called by the host OS, the last two by the TVM ("Trusted VM").
> These are implemented in the AMD PSP (platform processor).
> There are CMA/SPDM, IDE_KV, TDISP in use.
>
> Now, my strawman code does this on the host (I simplified a bit):
> - after PCI discovery but before probing: walk through all TDISP-capable
> (TEE-IO in PCIe caps) endpoint devices and call device_connect;
Would the host call device_connect unconditionally for all TEE-IO device
probed on the host? Wouldn't you want to do so only before the first
tdi_bind for a TDI that belongs to the physical device?
> - when drivers probe - it is all set up and the device measurements are
> visible to the driver;
> - when constructing a TVM, tdi_bind is called;
Here as well, the tdi_bind could be asynchronous to e.g. support hot
plugging TDIs into TVMs.
>
> and then in the TVM:
> - after PCI discovery but before probing: walk through all TDIs (which will
> have TEE IO bit set) and call tdi_info, verify the report, if ok - call
> tdi_validate;
By verify you mean verify the reported MMIO ranges? With support from
the TSM?
We discussed that a few times, but the device measurements and
attestation report should also be attested, i.e. run against a relying
party. The kernel may not be the right place for that, and I'm proposing
for the guest kernel to rely on a user space component and offload the
attestation part to it. This userspace component would then
synchronously return to the guest kernel with an attestation result.
> - when drivers probe - it is all set up and the driver decides if/which DMA
> mode to use (SWIOTLB or direct), or panic().
>
When would it panic?
> Uff. Too long already. Sorry. Now, go to the problems:
>
> If the user wants only CMA/SPDM,
By user here, you mean the user controlling the host? Or the TVM
user/owner? I assume the former.
> the Lukas'es patched will do that without
> the PSP. This may co-exist with the AMD PSP (if the endpoint allows multiple
> sessions).
>
> If the user wants only IDE, the AMD PSP's device_connect needs to be called
> and the host OS does not get to know the IDE keys. Other vendors allow
> programming IDE keys to the RC on the baremetal, and this also may co-exist
> with a TSM running outside of Linux - the host still manages trafic classes
> and streams.
>
> If the user wants TDISP for VMs, this assumes the user does not trust the
> host OS and therefore the TSM (which is trusted) has to do CMA/SPDM and IDE.
>
> The TSM code is not Linux and not shared among vendors. CMA/SPDM and IDE
> seem capable of co-existing, TDISP does not.
Which makes sense, TDISP is not designed to be used outside of the
TEE-IO VFs assigned to TVM use case.
>
> However there are common bits.
> - certificates/measurements/reports blobs: storing, presenting to the
> userspace (results of device_connect and tdi_bind);
> - place where we want to authenticate the device and enable IDE
> (device_connect);
> - place where we want to bind TDI to a TVM (tdi_bind).
>
> I've tried to address this with my (poorly named) drivers/pci/pcie/tdisp.ko
> and a hack for VFIO PCI device to call tdi_bind.
>
> The next steps:
> - expose blobs via configfs (like Dan did configfs-tsm);
> - s/tdisp.ko/coco.ko/;
> - ask the audience - what is missing to make it reusable for other vendors
> and uses?
The connect-bind-run flow is similar to the one we have defined for
RISC-V [1]. There we are defining the TEE-IO flows for RISC-V in
details, but nothing there is architectural and could somehow apply to
other architectures.
Cheers,
Samuel.
[1] https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-ap-tee-io/blob/main/specification/07-theory_operations.adoc
