On 28.05.21 18:42, Dan Williams wrote:
On Fri, May 28, 2021 at 1:58 AM David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 27.05.21 23:30, Dan Williams wrote:
On Thu, May 27, 2021 at 1:58 PM Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
[+cc Daniel, Krzysztof, Jason, Christoph, linux-pci]
On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 02:06:17PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
Close the hole of holding a mapping over kernel driver takeover event of
a given address range.
Commit 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
introduced CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM with the goal of protecting the
kernel against scenarios where a /dev/mem user tramples memory that a
kernel driver owns. However, this protection only prevents *new* read(),
write() and mmap() requests. Established mappings prior to the driver
calling request_mem_region() are left alone.
Especially with persistent memory, and the core kernel metadata that is
stored there, there are plentiful scenarios for a /dev/mem user to
violate the expectations of the driver and cause amplified damage.
Teach request_mem_region() to find and shoot down active /dev/mem
mappings that it believes it has successfully claimed for the exclusive
use of the driver. Effectively a driver call to request_mem_region()
becomes a hole-punch on the /dev/mem device.
This idea of hole-punching /dev/mem has since been extended to PCI
BARs via [1].
Correct me if I'm wrong: I think this means that if a user process has
mmapped a PCI BAR via sysfs, and a kernel driver subsequently requests
that region via pci_request_region() or similar, we punch holes in the
the user process mmap. The driver might be happy, but my guess is the
user starts seeing segmentation violations for no obvious reason and
is not happy.
Apart from the user process issue, the implementation of [1] is
problematic for PCI because the mmappable sysfs attributes now depend
on iomem_init_inode(), an fs_initcall, which means they can't be
static attributes, which ultimately leads to races in creating them.
See the comments in iomem_get_mapping(), and revoke_iomem():
/*
* Check that the initialization has completed. Losing the race
* is ok because it means drivers are claiming resources before
* the fs_initcall level of init and prevent iomem_get_mapping users
* from establishing mappings.
*/
...the observation being that it is ok for the revocation inode to
come on later in the boot process because userspace won't be able to
use the fs yet. So any missed calls to revoke_iomem() would fall back
to userspace just seeing the resource busy in the first instance. I.e.
through the normal devmem_is_allowed() exclusion.
So I'm raising the question of whether this hole-punch is the right
strategy.
- Prior to revoke_iomem(), __request_region() was very
self-contained and really only depended on the resource tree. Now
it depends on a lot of higher-level MM machinery to shoot down
mappings of other tasks. This adds quite a bit of complexity and
some new ordering constraints.
- Punching holes in the address space of an existing process seems
unfriendly. Maybe the driver's __request_region() should fail
instead, since the driver should be prepared to handle failure
there anyway.
It's prepared to handle failure, but in this case it is dealing with a
root user of 2 minds.
- [2] suggests that the hole punch protects drivers from /dev/mem
writers, especially with persistent memory. I'm not really
convinced. The hole punch does nothing to prevent a user process
from mmapping and corrupting something before the driver loads.
The motivation for this was a case that was swapping between /dev/mem
access and /dev/pmem0 access and they forgot to stop using /dev/mem
when they switched to /dev/pmem0. If root wants to use /dev/mem it can
use it, if root wants to stop the driver from loading it can set
mopdrobe policy or manually unbind, and if root asks the kernel to
load the driver while it is actively using /dev/mem something has to
give. Given root has other options to stop a driver the decision to
revoke userspace access when root messes up and causes a collision
seems prudent to me.
Is there a real use case for mapping pmem via /dev/mem or could we just
prohibit the access to these areas completely?
The kernel offers conflicting access to iomem resources and a
long-standing mechanism to enforce mutual exclusion
(CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM) between those interfaces. That mechanism was
found to be incomplete for the case where a /dev/mem mapping is
maintained after a kernel driver is attached, and incomplete for other
mechanisms to map iomem like pci-sysfs. This was found with PMEM, but
the issue is larger and applies to userspace drivers / debug in
general.
What's the use case for "swapping between /dev/mem access and /dev/pmem0
access" ?
"Who knows". I mean, I know in this case it was a platform validation
test using /dev/mem for "reasons", but I am not sure that is relevant
to the wider concern. If CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=n exclusion is
enforced when drivers pass the IORESOURCE_EXCLUSIVE flag, if
CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=y exclusion is enforced whenever the kernel
marks a resource IORESOURCE_BUSY, and if kernel lockdown is enabled
the driver state is moot as LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM and LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS
policy is in effect.
I was thinking about a mechanism to permanently disallow /dev/mem access
to specific memory regions (BUSY or not) in any /dev/mem mode. In my
case, it would apply to the whole virtio-mem provided memory region.
Once the driver is loaded, it would disallow access to the whole region.
I thought about doing it via the kernel resource tree, extending the
EXCLUSIVE flag to !BUSY SYSRAM regions. But a simplistic list managed in
/dev/mem code would also be possible.
That's why I wondered if we could just disallow access to these physical
PMEM memory regions right from the start similarly, such that we don't
have to really care about revoking in case of PMEM anymore.
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
