Re: [PATCH v4] /dev/mem: Revoke mappings when a driver claims the region

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On 27.05.21 23:30, Dan Williams wrote:
On Thu, May 27, 2021 at 1:58 PM Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

[+cc Daniel, Krzysztof, Jason, Christoph, linux-pci]

On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 02:06:17PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
Close the hole of holding a mapping over kernel driver takeover event of
a given address range.

Commit 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
introduced CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM with the goal of protecting the
kernel against scenarios where a /dev/mem user tramples memory that a
kernel driver owns. However, this protection only prevents *new* read(),
write() and mmap() requests. Established mappings prior to the driver
calling request_mem_region() are left alone.

Especially with persistent memory, and the core kernel metadata that is
stored there, there are plentiful scenarios for a /dev/mem user to
violate the expectations of the driver and cause amplified damage.

Teach request_mem_region() to find and shoot down active /dev/mem
mappings that it believes it has successfully claimed for the exclusive
use of the driver. Effectively a driver call to request_mem_region()
becomes a hole-punch on the /dev/mem device.

This idea of hole-punching /dev/mem has since been extended to PCI
BARs via [1].

Correct me if I'm wrong: I think this means that if a user process has
mmapped a PCI BAR via sysfs, and a kernel driver subsequently requests
that region via pci_request_region() or similar, we punch holes in the
the user process mmap.  The driver might be happy, but my guess is the
user starts seeing segmentation violations for no obvious reason and
is not happy.

Apart from the user process issue, the implementation of [1] is
problematic for PCI because the mmappable sysfs attributes now depend
on iomem_init_inode(), an fs_initcall, which means they can't be
static attributes, which ultimately leads to races in creating them.

See the comments in iomem_get_mapping(), and revoke_iomem():

         /*
          * Check that the initialization has completed. Losing the race
          * is ok because it means drivers are claiming resources before
          * the fs_initcall level of init and prevent iomem_get_mapping users
          * from establishing mappings.
          */

...the observation being that it is ok for the revocation inode to
come on later in the boot process because userspace won't be able to
use the fs yet. So any missed calls to revoke_iomem() would fall back
to userspace just seeing the resource busy in the first instance. I.e.
through the normal devmem_is_allowed() exclusion.


So I'm raising the question of whether this hole-punch is the right
strategy.

   - Prior to revoke_iomem(), __request_region() was very
     self-contained and really only depended on the resource tree.  Now
     it depends on a lot of higher-level MM machinery to shoot down
     mappings of other tasks.  This adds quite a bit of complexity and
     some new ordering constraints.

   - Punching holes in the address space of an existing process seems
     unfriendly.  Maybe the driver's __request_region() should fail
     instead, since the driver should be prepared to handle failure
     there anyway.

It's prepared to handle failure, but in this case it is dealing with a
root user of 2 minds.


   - [2] suggests that the hole punch protects drivers from /dev/mem
     writers, especially with persistent memory.  I'm not really
     convinced.  The hole punch does nothing to prevent a user process
     from mmapping and corrupting something before the driver loads.

The motivation for this was a case that was swapping between /dev/mem
access and /dev/pmem0 access and they forgot to stop using /dev/mem
when they switched to /dev/pmem0. If root wants to use /dev/mem it can
use it, if root wants to stop the driver from loading it can set
mopdrobe policy or manually unbind, and if root asks the kernel to
load the driver while it is actively using /dev/mem something has to
give. Given root has other options to stop a driver the decision to
revoke userspace access when root messes up and causes a collision
seems prudent to me.


Is there a real use case for mapping pmem via /dev/mem or could we just prohibit the access to these areas completely?

What's the use case for "swapping between /dev/mem access and /dev/pmem0 access" ?

--
Thanks,

David / dhildenb




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