On Thu, Nov 15, 2012 at 12:41:43PM +0000, Siarhei Siamashka wrote: > On Thu, Nov 15, 2012 at 1:01 PM, Catalin Marinas > <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 15, 2012 at 12:54:48AM +0000, Rob Herring wrote: > >> On 11/14/2012 04:21 PM, Tony Lindgren wrote: > >> > * Rob Herring <robherring2@xxxxxxxxx> [121114 13:59]: > >> >> On 11/14/2012 02:32 PM, Tony Lindgren wrote: > >> >>> > >> >>> Checking for the bit already set should work in this case, I'll post > >> >>> a patch for that shortly. > >> >> > >> >> Can you actually read the state of the diagnostic register in non-secure > >> >> mode? If you can on the A9, is the same true on A8 or others? > >> > > >> > Looks like it can be read on at least TI omap 4430 which is A9. > >> > But it reads as zero, so the below patch is what I came up with. > >> > > >> > No idea if assuming that zero value for the diagnostic register > >> > is safe.. What's the default value of the diagnostic register supposed > >> > to be? > >> > >> RTFM. Oh, wait it's a super secret, undocumented register. We shouldn't > >> even be talking about it. > >> > >> It could vary by rev, but I see 0 for the reset value, so this would not > >> work if the bootloader did not do any setup of the diagnostic register. > >> > >> One way to determine secure mode on the A9 would be seeing if you can > >> change the auxcr register. Something like this (untested): > >> > >> mrc p15, 0, r0, c1, c0, 1; Read ACTLR > >> eor r1, r0, #0x100 ; Modify alloc in 1 way > >> mcr p15, 0, r1, c1, c0, 1 > >> mrc p15, 0, r2, c1, c0, 1; Read ACTLR > >> mcr p15, 0, r0, c1, c0, 1 ; Restore original value > >> cmp r1, r2 > >> bne skip_errata > > > > This would fail on platforms where Linux runs in non-secure mode. What > > we do for some errata workarounds is to test whether the bit was already > > set and avoid writing the register. But this assumes that, for a given > > workaround in the kernel, there is a corresponding workaround in the > > code running before the kernel (boot-loader, firmware) which sets that > > bit. > > > > Since the kernel will run more often in non-secure mode (on Cortex-A15 > > you need this for the virtualisation extensions) I strongly suggest that > > the workaround (usually undocumented bit setting) is done before the > > kernel is started and we simply remove it from Linux (or add a clear > > comment that it only works if running in secure mode; if unsure say > > 'N'). > > > > I don't think it's worth the hassle detecting whether the kernel runs in > > secure or non-secure mode, just assume the latter and get SoC vendors to > > update the boot loaders or firmware (if possible) with any errata > > workarounds. > > > > Having a common SMC API for errata workarounds is not feasible since not > > all registers are public, most are implementation specific and it could > > have secure implications with exposing them. > > BTW, I always wondered about what could be preventing TI and the other > silicon vendors from using something like an SMC API based on > asymmetric cryptography? My understanding is that for OMAP4 GP chips, > ROM code switches to non-secure mode before passing control to the > bootloader and there is simply no way to workaround bugs like this. AFAIK, there are some SMCs to the OMAP secure firmware that allow such bits to be set (see omap4_l2x0_set_debug() for example). I'm not sure they are documented. But we can't have a standard SMC API since the registers affected are not standard (nor documented). Which means that such workarounds must be applied in the bootloader specific to that platform. Even if it is running in non-secure mode, it can be made aware of the SMC API provided by the secure firmware. -- Catalin -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-omap" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
