On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 1:05 PM, Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > >> On May 25, 2018, at 9:47 AM, Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 12:44 PM, Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> Hi Olga- >>>> >>>>> On May 25, 2018, at 7:02 AM, Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thank you for the comments. Will hopefully address them in the next version. >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, May 24, 2018 at 8:50 PM, Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>> Hi Olga- >>>>>> >>>>>>> On May 24, 2018, at 1:05 PM, Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If the user supplies a clientaddr value, >>>>>> >>>>>> Please say "NFS client administrator" not "user". A >>>>>> "user" is any non-privileged user, so saying that a >>>>>> "user" can set this value is misleading. >>>>> >>>>> Ok will change it. >>>>> >>>>>>> it should be either >>>>>>> a special value of either IPV4/IPV6 any address or a local address >>>>>>> on the same network that the server being mounted. >>>>>> >>>>>> This option should allow any local address the client has, >>>>>> not just an address that is on the same network as the >>>>>> server. See below for further explanation. >>>>> >>>>> Ok, I added this to the comment specifically as I didn't know if this >>>>> would pose a problem. I didn't know if allowing any address was useful >>>>> as when it's not specified the address on the same network as the >>>>> server is chosen. >>>> >>>> Yep, any of the client's local addresses should be allowed. >>>> >>>> >>>>>>> Otherwise, we >>>>>>> disallow the client to use an arbitrary value of the clientaddr value. >>>>>>> This value is used to construct a client id of SETCLIENTID and >>>>>>> providing a false value can interfere with the real owner's mount. >>>>>> >>>>>> The patch description is misleading: >>>>>> >>>>>> Interference occurs only if the real owner's lease is >>>>>> not protected by Kerberos AND this client has the same >>>>>> client ID string as another client. >>>>> >>>>> Ok I will add this more explicit detail when the interference occurs >>>>> (when neither of the machines are using Kerberos and the other client >>>>> machine is not using a module parameter to add a unique identifier to >>>>> the client ID string). I think otherwise it is knowns that client ID >>>>> is created with the value of the clientaddr. >>>> >>>> The only way a problem occurs is if the clientaddr is the >>>> same AND the cl_nodename is the same. How is that happening? >>> >>> Client ID in the SETCLIENTID is constructed by >>> nfs4_init_nonuniform_client_string() function and it uses cl_ipaddr >>> and not cl_nodename. >>> >>>> Why are the cl_nodenames the same? If they are not the same, >>>> then it is not possible that the clients' leases are inter- >>>> fering with each other, and something else is going on. >>>> >>>> >>>>>> The Linux client's client ID string also contains the >>>>>> system's cl_nodename. Both the cl_nodename and the >>>>>> callback address have to be the same as some other >>>>>> client's, and they both have to be Linux, for this to >>>>>> be a problem. >>>>>> >>>>>> It's more likely that the customer's clients are all >>>>>> named the same (maybe they are copied from the same >>>>>> system image), and reverse DNS lookup is giving them >>>>>> all the same clientaddr= . That's an unsupported >>>>>> configuration and there are already ways to address >>>>>> this. >>>>>> >>>>>> Or perhaps I don't understand the use case that is >>>>>> causing the problem. Can the patch description explain >>>>>> why your customer is trying to set clientaddr= ? >>>>> >>>>> The customer case was a simple mistake of including the wrong address. >>>> >>>> But that doesn't answer the question. Why did the >>>> customer feel the need to set clientaddr= ? >>> >>> I don't know. In the end they decided they didn't need the clientaddr at all. >>> >>>>> Do you fundamentally disagree that there is a case for >>>>> denial-of-service here? >>>> >>>> The only service that is affected if the clientaddr is >> >> Forgot to address this. This is definitely not true. Both clients are >> effected as they end up "sharing" the lease. So each client once it >> gets a lease error has to go and renegotiate the lease and can perhaps >> get an operation in before the other client will send something which >> would then get and error and it would deals with the lease error. > > My claim is correct for the uniform client ID string. Agreed! > I did not realize that the non-uniform client ID string > is not well-constructed. I'm glad we are finally on the same page :-) > > >>>> set incorrectly is on the client where the mistake >>>> occurs. If the cl_nodenames are all unique then other >>>> clients should not be affected by the mistake. If >>>> that is happening, that's a server bug. >>>> >>>> If the problem was that the customer set the wrong >>>> address, let's say that, rather than claiming that the >>>> patch prevents lease tampering. >>> >>> Ok I can change it to lease tampering (I really don't care that much). >>> But to just to discuss a bit further, how's lease tampering not a >>> denial-of-service? It interfere with a client's ability to make >>> progress. >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Chuck Lever > > -- > Chuck Lever > > > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html