Re: [PATCH 1/1] nfs-utils: Add check of clientaddr argument

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> On May 25, 2018, at 9:47 AM, Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 12:44 PM, Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> Hi Olga-
>>> 
>>>> On May 25, 2018, at 7:02 AM, Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Thank you for the comments. Will hopefully address them in the next version.
>>>> 
>>>> On Thu, May 24, 2018 at 8:50 PM, Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>> Hi Olga-
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On May 24, 2018, at 1:05 PM, Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> If the user supplies a clientaddr value,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Please say "NFS client administrator" not "user". A
>>>>> "user" is any non-privileged user, so saying that a
>>>>> "user" can set this value is misleading.
>>>> 
>>>> Ok will change it.
>>>> 
>>>>>> it should be either
>>>>>> a special value of either IPV4/IPV6 any address or a local address
>>>>>> on the same network that the server being mounted.
>>>>> 
>>>>> This option should allow any local address the client has,
>>>>> not just an address that is on the same network as the
>>>>> server. See below for further explanation.
>>>> 
>>>> Ok, I added this to the comment specifically as I didn't know if this
>>>> would pose a problem. I didn't know if allowing any address was useful
>>>> as when it's not specified the address on the same network as the
>>>> server is chosen.
>>> 
>>> Yep, any of the client's local addresses should be allowed.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>>>> Otherwise, we
>>>>>> disallow the client to use an arbitrary value of the clientaddr value.
>>>>>> This value is used to construct a client id of SETCLIENTID and
>>>>>> providing a false value can interfere with the real owner's mount.
>>>>> 
>>>>> The patch description is misleading:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Interference occurs only if the real owner's lease is
>>>>> not protected by Kerberos AND this client has the same
>>>>> client ID string as another client.
>>>> 
>>>> Ok I will add this more explicit detail when the interference occurs
>>>> (when neither of the machines are using Kerberos and the other client
>>>> machine is not using a module parameter to add a unique identifier to
>>>> the client ID string). I think otherwise it is knowns that client ID
>>>> is created with the value of the clientaddr.
>>> 
>>> The only way a problem occurs is if the clientaddr is the
>>> same AND the cl_nodename is the same. How is that happening?
>> 
>> Client ID in the SETCLIENTID is constructed by
>> nfs4_init_nonuniform_client_string() function and it uses cl_ipaddr
>> and not cl_nodename.
>> 
>>> Why are the cl_nodenames the same? If they are not the same,
>>> then it is not possible that the clients' leases are inter-
>>> fering with each other, and something else is going on.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>>> The Linux client's client ID string also contains the
>>>>> system's cl_nodename. Both the cl_nodename and the
>>>>> callback address have to be the same as some other
>>>>> client's, and they both have to be Linux, for this to
>>>>> be a problem.
>>>>> 
>>>>> It's more likely that the customer's clients are all
>>>>> named the same (maybe they are copied from the same
>>>>> system image), and reverse DNS lookup is giving them
>>>>> all the same clientaddr= . That's an unsupported
>>>>> configuration and there are already ways to address
>>>>> this.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Or perhaps I don't understand the use case that is
>>>>> causing the problem. Can the patch description explain
>>>>> why your customer is trying to set clientaddr= ?
>>>> 
>>>> The customer case was a simple mistake of including the wrong address.
>>> 
>>> But that doesn't answer the question. Why did the
>>> customer feel the need to set clientaddr= ?
>> 
>> I don't know. In the end they decided they didn't need the clientaddr at all.
>> 
>>>> Do you fundamentally disagree that there is a case for
>>>> denial-of-service here?
>>> 
>>> The only service that is affected if the clientaddr is
> 
> Forgot to address this. This is definitely not true. Both clients are
> effected as they end up "sharing" the lease. So each client once it
> gets a lease error has to go and renegotiate the lease and can perhaps
> get an operation in before the other client will send something which
> would then get and error and it would deals with the lease error.

My claim is correct for the uniform client ID string. I
did not realize that the non-uniform client ID string
is not well-constructed.


>>> set incorrectly is on the client where the mistake
>>> occurs. If the cl_nodenames are all unique then other
>>> clients should not be affected by the mistake. If
>>> that is happening, that's a server bug.
>>> 
>>> If the problem was that the customer set the wrong
>>> address, let's say that, rather than claiming that the
>>> patch prevents lease tampering.
>> 
>> Ok I can change it to lease tampering (I really don't care that much).
>> But to just to discuss a bit further, how's lease tampering not a
>> denial-of-service? It interfere with a client's ability to make
>> progress.
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
>>> Chuck Lever

--
Chuck Lever



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