Re: [PATCH 2/5] NFS: __nfs_revalidate_inode() - use the nfs4_label to update file security info

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On Nov 4, 2013, at 16:24, Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On Mon, 4 Nov 2013 21:00:46 +0000
> "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> On Nov 4, 2013, at 15:51, Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> 
>>> Currently, we just discard the nfs4_label information, instead of using it
>>> to update the file LSM security info.
>>> 
>>> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> 
>> I forgot to add a "Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>”. Fixed now...
>> 
>>> ---
>>> fs/nfs/inode.c | 1 +
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>>> 
>>> diff --git a/fs/nfs/inode.c b/fs/nfs/inode.c
>>> index 471ba59c42f9..09d4df5f588a 100644
>>> --- a/fs/nfs/inode.c
>>> +++ b/fs/nfs/inode.c
>>> @@ -920,6 +920,7 @@ __nfs_revalidate_inode(struct nfs_server *server, struct inode *inode)
>>> 		goto err_out;
>>> 	}
>>> 
>>> +	nfs_setsecurity(inode, fattr, label);
>>> 	if (nfsi->cache_validity & NFS_INO_INVALID_ACL)
>>> 		nfs_zap_acl_cache(inode);
>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> 1.8.3.1
>>> 
>> 
> 
> No worries -- looks fine.
> 
> Out of curiousity, is there a reason to call nfs_setsecurity prior to
> zapping the ACL cache? The patch I had proposed did it afterward, but I
> didn't think it mattered much either way...

It shouldn’t make a huge difference, no; either way, there be plenty races here…

Trond--
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