On Mon, 4 Nov 2013 21:00:46 +0000 "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Nov 4, 2013, at 15:51, Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > Currently, we just discard the nfs4_label information, instead of using it > > to update the file LSM security info. > > > > Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx> > > I forgot to add a "Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>”. Fixed now... > > > --- > > fs/nfs/inode.c | 1 + > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) > > > > diff --git a/fs/nfs/inode.c b/fs/nfs/inode.c > > index 471ba59c42f9..09d4df5f588a 100644 > > --- a/fs/nfs/inode.c > > +++ b/fs/nfs/inode.c > > @@ -920,6 +920,7 @@ __nfs_revalidate_inode(struct nfs_server *server, struct inode *inode) > > goto err_out; > > } > > > > + nfs_setsecurity(inode, fattr, label); > > if (nfsi->cache_validity & NFS_INO_INVALID_ACL) > > nfs_zap_acl_cache(inode); > > > > -- > > 1.8.3.1 > > > No worries -- looks fine. Out of curiousity, is there a reason to call nfs_setsecurity prior to zapping the ACL cache? The patch I had proposed did it afterward, but I didn't think it mattered much either way... Thanks, -- Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx> -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
