On Thu, 2013-07-18 at 20:04 +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote:
> Another issue: Is it out of spec to do what we plan and "just use" the nfs_client's rpc_client for all state manager operations without checking if the server supports it from the SP4_MACH_CRED EXCHANGE_ID negotiation?
It should always be OK to use the machine credential (i.e. the
credential we used for EXCHANGE_ID) for other global state operations
such as DESTROY_CLIENTID, CREATE_SESSION, DESTROY_SESSION,
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION, BACKCHANNEL_CTL, SEQUENCE, etc.
The point is that if we don't use state protection, then someone else is
allowed to come in using a different credential, and call any one of the
above operations.
So our current implementation is quite OK. It's just that without state
protection, we can't stop others from destroying our session, say.
--
Trond Myklebust
Linux NFS client maintainer
NetApp
Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx
www.netapp.com
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