On Thu, 02 May 2024, Chuck Lever III wrote: > > > > On May 2, 2024, at 1:37 PM, Scott Mayhew <smayhew@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Thu, 02 May 2024, Chuck Lever III wrote: > > > >>> On May 2, 2024, at 11:54 AM, Scott Mayhew <smayhew@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >>> > >>> Red Hat QE identified an "interesting" issue with NFSv3 and TLS, in that an > >>> NFSv3 client can mount with "xprtsec=none" a filesystem exported with > >>> "xprtsec=tls:mtls" (in the sense that the client gets the filehandle and adds a > >>> mount to its mount table - it can't actually access the mount). > >>> > >>> Here's an example using machines from the recent Bakeathon. > >>> > >>> Mounting a server with TLS enabled: > >>> > >>> # mount -o v4.2,sec=sys,xprtsec=tls oracle-102.chuck.lever.oracle.com.nfsv4.dev:/export/tls /mnt > >>> # umount /mnt > >>> > >>> Trying to mount without "xprtsec=tls" shows that the filesystem is not exported with "xprtsec=none": > >>> > >>> # mount -o v4.2,sec=sys oracle-102.chuck.lever.oracle.com.nfsv4.dev:/export/tls /mnt > >>> mount.nfs: Operation not permitted for oracle-102.chuck.lever.oracle.com.nfsv4.dev:/export/tls on /mnt > >>> > >>> Yet a v3 mount without "xprtsec=tls" works: > >>> > >>> # mount -o v3,sec=sys oracle-102.chuck.lever.oracle.com.nfsv4.dev:/export/tls /mnt > >>> # umount /mnt > >>> > >>> and a mount with no explicit version and without "xprtsec=tls" falls back to > >>> v3 and also "works": > >>> > >>> # mount -o sec=sys oracle-102.chuck.lever.oracle.com.nfsv4.dev:/export/tls /mnt > >>> # grep ora /proc/mounts > >>> oracle-102.chuck.lever.oracle.com.nfsv4.dev:/export/tls /mnt nfs > >>> +rw,relatime,vers=3,rsize=524288,wsize=524288,namlen=255,hard,proto=tcp,timeo=600,retrans=2,sec=sys,mountaddr=100.64.0.49,mountvers=3,mountport=20048,mountproto=udp,local_lock=none,addr=100.64.0.49 0 0 > >>> > >>> Even though the filesystem is mounted, the client can't do anything with it: > >>> > >>> # ls /mnt > >>> ls: cannot open directory '/mnt': Permission denied > >>> > >>> When krb5 is used with NFSv3, the server returns a list of pseudoflavors in > >>> mountres3_ok (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1813#section-5.2.1). > >>> The client compares that list with its own list of auth flavors parsed from the > >>> mount request and returns -EACCES if no match is found (see > >>> nfs_verify_authflavors()). > >>> > >>> Perhaps we should be doing something similar with xprtsec policies? > >> > >> The problem might be in how you've set up the exports. With NFSv3, > >> the parent export needs the "crossmnt" export option in order for > >> NFSv3 to behave like NFSv4 in this regard, although I could have > >> missed something. > > > > I was mounting your server though :) > > OK, then not the same bug that Olga found last year. > > We should find out what FreeBSD does in this case. I thought about that. Rick's servers from the BAT are offline, and I don't think he was exporting v3 anyway. > > > >>> Should > >>> there be an errata to RFC 9289 and a request from IANA for assigned numbers for > >>> pseudo-flavors corresponding to xprtsec policies? > >> > >> No. Transport-layer security is not an RPC security flavor or > >> pseudo-flavor. These two things are not related. > >> > >> (And in fact, I proposed something like this for NFSv4 SECINFO, > >> but it was rejected). > > > > I thought it might be a stretch to try to use mountres3.auth_flavors for > > this, but since RFC 9289 does refer to AUTH_TLS as an authentication > > flavor and https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpc-authentication-numbers/rpc-authentication-numbers.xhtml > > also lists TLS under the Flavor Name column I thought it might make > > sense to treat xprtsec policies as if they were pseudo-flavors even > > though they're not, if only to give the client a way to determine that > > the mount should fail. > > RPC_AUTH_TLS is used only when a client probes a server to see if > it supports RPC-with-TLS. At all other times, the client uses one > of the normal, legitimate flavors. It does not represent a security > flavor that can be used during regular operation. > > NFSv3 mount failover logic is still open for discussion (ie, incomplete). > > Would it help if rpc.mountd stuck RPC_AUTH_TLS in the auth_flavors > list? I think clients that don't recognize it should ignore it, > but I'm not sure. What should a client do if it sees that flavor in > the list? It's not one that can be used for any other procedure than > a NULL RPC. Maybe? After the client gets the filehandle it's calling FSINFO and PATHCONF. The latter get NFS3ERR_ACCES, but nfs_probe_fsinfo() isn't checking for a negative return code from the PATHCONF operation. If it did, it could maybe use the -EACCES coupled with the knowledge that the server had RPC_AUTH_TLS enabled to emit an error message saying to check the xprtsec policies (but I don't think that would be as definitive as what I had in mind) and to fail the mount. -Scott > > > >>> If not, this behavior should at least be documented in the man pages. > >> > >> "crossmnt", and it's kin "nohide", are explained in exports(5). > > > > rpc.mountd doesn't do any access checking based on xprtsec policies on > > the export (or krb5 pseudo-flavors, for that matter), so I don't see how > > "crossmount" or "nohide" would have any effect here. > > No, they don't, you are correct. > > > -- > Chuck Lever > >
