At 09:35 AM 9/25/2008, Tom Tucker wrote: >> This explanation is helpful, thanks. It would also be helpful if we >> could boil down the advice to just a sentence or two for the busy admin. >> Something like: unless you have card XYZ and kernel 2.6.y, do *not* use >> rdma on a network where you cannot trust every machine.... > > >Would it be better to say, "Do not use RDMA on a network where your >policy requires a security model stronger than tcp/auth_unix." No! This would confuse integrity and privacy concerns (the root of the RDMA attack you describe) with authentication. While it's true there are different attacks with a different transport, they do not in any way contravene the protections in the RPC and NFS layers. In fact, I believe the text is unfairly protraying a vulnerability in iWARP as to be residing in NFS/RDMA, which is isn't. While many of today's adapters allow so-called "type 2" RKEYs, the protocol does not encourage them, and their use introduces these risks. The risks are avoidable. The IETF RFCs describe these in detail, for both RDDP and NFS/RPC/RDMA. Tom. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
