Re: SA selector checks alone are not enough

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Hello!

> The network 10.10.10.0/24 is the trusted network T.  Any packets
> with source addresses in T via the ESP tunnel are genuine.

What does make it "trusted"? I do not see any references to this
subnet in the description. It is not wonderful that such trusted
network turns out to be untrusted eventually. :-)


> if we sacrifice a bit of elegance and allow the eligible IPIP
> tunnel to match the IPCOMP SA.

Actually, you have already sacrificed all the elegance earlier. :-)


> which currently can only be achieved with multiple SAs unless you
> make the selector wider than it should be.

Despite of ironical comments above, I understand that it is real
source of pain. OK, let's split the problem:

1. Enforcing single subnet selector on SA is evil. Agreed and ready
   to accept any solution for this, including even your one, despye of
   it is very indirect.
2. That T subnet... I do not understand, if it is "trusted", you have
   some policy for this which asserts this trust. How could spoofed
   packets pass through this policy? Please, understand, I still
   think you are going to take a magic cure, which would make feel
   you healthy both wrt 1 and 2. But it will not unless you have
   the picture clean.

Alexey
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