On Tue, 2016-12-27 at 16:48 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 27, 2016 at 4:39 PM, Ricardo Neri
> <ricardo.neri-calderon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Fri, 2016-12-23 at 18:11 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 5:37 PM, Ricardo Neri
> >> <ricardo.neri-calderon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> > The feature User-Mode Instruction Prevention present in recent Intel
> >> > processor prevents a group of instructions from being executed with
> >> > CPL > 0. Otherwise, a general protection fault is issued.
> >> >
> >> > Rather than relaying this fault to the user space (in the form of a SIGSEGV
> >> > signal), the instructions protected by UMIP can be emulated to provide
> >> > dummy results. This allows to conserve the current kernel behavior and not
> >> > reveal the system resources that UMIP intends to protect (the global
> >> > descriptor and interrupt descriptor tables, the segment selectors of the
> >> > local descriptor table and the task state and the machine status word).
> >> >
> >> > This emulation is needed because certain applications (e.g., WineHQ) rely
> >> > on this subset of instructions to function.
> >> >
> >> > The instructions protected by UMIP can be split in two groups. Those who
> >> > return a kernel memory address (sgdt and sidt) and those who return a
> >> > value (sldt, str and smsw).
> >> >
> >> > For the instructions that return a kernel memory address, the result is
> >> > emulated as the location of a dummy variable in the kernel memory space.
> >> > This is needed as applications such as WineHQ rely on the result being
> >> > located in the kernel memory space function. The limit for the GDT and the
> >> > IDT are set to zero.
> >>
> >> Nak. This is a trivial KASLR bypass. Just give them hardcoded
> >> values. For x86_64, I would suggest 0xfffffffffffe0000 and
> >> 0xffffffffffff0000.
> >
> > I see. I assume you are suggesting these values for x86_64 because they
> > lie in an unused hole. That makes sense to me.
> >
> > For the case of x86_32, I have trouble finding a suitable place as there
> > are not many available holes. It could be put before VMALLOC_START or
> > after VMALLOC_END but this would reveal the position of the vmalloc
> > area. Although, to my knowledge, randomized memory is not available for
> > x86_32. Without randomization, does it hurt to make sidt/sgdt return the
> > address of a kernel static variable?
>
> I would just use the same addresses, truncated. There's no reason
> that the address needs to be truly not present -- it just needs to be
> inaccessible to user code. Anything near the top of the address space
> should work.
Right. Then I will reuse the same addresses.
>
> >
> >>
> >> >
> >> > The instructions sldt and str return a segment selector relative to the
> >> > base address of the global descriptor table. Since the actual address of
> >> > such table is not revealed, it makes sense to emulate the result as zero.
> >>
> >> Hmm, now I wonder if anything uses SLDT to see if there is an LDT. If
> >> so, we could emulate it better, but I doubt this matters.
> >
> > So you are saying that the emulated sldt should return a different value
> > based on the presence/absence of a LDT? This could reveal this very
> > fact.
>
> User code knows whether the LDT exists because an LDT only exists if
> the program called modify_ldt(). But I doubt this matters in
> practice.
In such a case sldt would return a non-null segment selector. I will
keep giving the null segment selector in all cases and make a note in
the code.
>
> >> > +static int __emulate_umip_insn(struct insn *insn, enum umip_insn umip_inst,
> >> > + unsigned char *data, int *data_size)
> >> > +{
> >> > + unsigned long const *dummy_base_addr;
> >> > + unsigned short dummy_limit = 0;
> >> > + unsigned short dummy_value = 0;
> >> > +
> >> > + switch (umip_inst) {
> >> > + /*
> >> > + * These two instructions return the base address and limit of the
> >> > + * global and interrupt descriptor table. The base address can be
> >> > + * 32-bit or 64-bit. Limit is always 16-bit.
> >> > + */
> >> > + case UMIP_SGDT:
> >> > + case UMIP_SIDT:
> >> > + if (umip_inst == UMIP_SGDT)
> >> > + dummy_base_addr = &umip_dummy_gdt_base;
> >> > + else
> >> > + dummy_base_addr = &umip_dummy_idt_base;
> >> > + if (X86_MODRM_MOD(insn->modrm.value) == 3) {
> >> > + WARN_ONCE(1, "SGDT cannot take register as argument!\n");
> >>
> >> No warnings please.
> >
> > I'll. Remove it.
>
> Thanks. In general, WARN_ONCE, etc are supposed to indicate kernel
> bugs, not user bugs.
Agreed. Your statement makes it very clear. I didn't have it that clear
in my mind.
>
> >> > + int not_copied, nr_copied, reg_offset, dummy_data_size;
> >> > + void __user *uaddr;
> >> > + unsigned long *reg_addr;
> >> > + enum umip_insn umip_inst;
> >> > +
> >> > + not_copied = copy_from_user(buf, (void __user *)regs->ip, sizeof(buf));
> >>
> >> This is slightly wrong due to PKRU. I doubt we care.
> >
> > I see. If I am not mistaken, if the memory is protected by a protection
> > key this would cause a page fault. I'll make a note of it.
>
> Exactly. This is correct behavior unless the key happens to be set up
> so it can be executed but not read, in which case emulation will fail.
If we can't read we can't emulate anyways. I will add another note.
>
> >>
> >> > + nr_copied = sizeof(buf) - not_copied;
> >> > + /*
> >> > + * The decoder _should_ fail nicely if we pass it a short buffer.
> >> > + * But, let's not depend on that implementation detail. If we
> >> > + * did not get anything, just error out now.
> >> > + */
> >> > + if (!nr_copied)
> >> > + return -EFAULT;
> >>
> >> If the caller cares about EINVAL vs EFAULT, it cares because it is
> >> considering changing the signal to a fake page fault. If so, then
> >> this should be EINVAL -- failure to read the text should just prevent
> >> emulation.
> >
> > I see. The caller in this case do_general_protection, which will issue a
> > SIGSEGV to the user space anyways. I don't think it cares about the
> > EINVAL vs EFAULT. It does care about whether the emulation was
> > successful.
>
> Maybe just make it return bool then? But fixing up the return codes
> would be fine, too. I just think that, if it returns int, the value
> should be meaningful.
Right. I have a small query/proposal related to this below.
>
> >> > + if (nr_copied > 0)
> >> > + return -EFAULT;
> >>
> >> This should be the only EFAULT case.
> > Should this be EFAULT event if the caller cares only about successful
> > (return 0) vs failed (return non-0) emulation?
>
> In theory this particular error would be a page fault not a general
> protection fault (in the UMIP off case). If you were emulating it
> extra carefully, you could change the signal accordingly. But, as I
> said, I really doubt this matters.
If simple enough and for the sake of accuracy, I could try to issue the
page fault. It seems to me that this entitles calling
force_sig_info_fault in this particular case as opposed to the
force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, SEND_SIG_PRIV, tsk) that do_general_protection
calls.
Thanks and BR,
Ricardo
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-msdos" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
