Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] mmc: Check CAP_SYS_ADMIN for destructive ioctl ACMDs

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On Tue, Apr 5, 2011 at 6:40 PM, John Calixto
<john.calixto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> In MMC-land:
>> CMD18 is PROGRAM_CID (which is a once-in-a-lifetime operation).
>> CMD38 is erase
>> CMD25 is write_multiple_block - this can give a non-root user full
>> control over a disk, bypassing security.
>
> Hi Andrei,
>
> I have CMD18 as READ_MULTIPLE_BLOCK...  Regardless, this ioctl is
> specifically for ACMD opcodes (application-specific; preceeded by
> CMD55), not CMD opcodes.

I'm sorry, I meant CMD26 instead of 18.

Could you check the SD behavior for undefined ACMDs? If I do ACMD25,
and ACMD25 is not defined, will it be executed as CMD25? This is the
MMC behavior as I have mentioned.
If so, that means you will be able to bypass access control and be
able to (at the very least) read/write block as non-root.

Is there a way for SD to verify which ACMDs the card actually
supports? As far as MMC is concerned - no. I really wish ACMD had
their own classes as well.

A
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