On 1/24/24 10:57, Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 09:10:58AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
On Wed, 24 Jan 2024 at 08:54, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Hmm. That whole thing is disgusting. I think it should have checked
FMODE_EXEC, and I have no idea why it doesn't.
Maybe because FMODE_EXEC gets set for uselib() calls too? I dunno. I
think it would be even better if we had the 'intent' flags from
'struct open_flags' available, but they aren't there in the
file_open() security chain.
I've tested AppArmor, and this works fine:
thanks. I also ran it through the regression test suit, to double
check so that Murphy doesn't bite.
that this even tripped a regression is a bug that I am going to
have to chase down. The file check at this point should just be
redundant.
thanks for the quick fix
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 7717354ce095..ab104ce05f96 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
* implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
* actually execute the image.
*/
- if (current->in_execve) {
+ if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) {
fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
return 0;
}
Converting TOMOYO is less obvious to me, though, as it has a helper that
isn't strictly always called during open(). I haven't finished figuring
out the call graphs for it...
