Hi Hillf,
On Sat, 2023-01-07 08:07:02 +0000, Hillf Danton <hdanton@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 6, 2023 at 2:49 PM Munehisa Kamata <kamatam@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > We found the following use-after-free with userspace code polling on
> > a pressure file in a non-root cgroup using epoll.
> >
> > [ 57.183661] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x76/0x130
> > [ 57.186662] Write of size 4 at addr ffff888114976428 by task a.out/2426
> >
> > [ 57.190551] CPU: 0 PID: 2426 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2+ #16
> > [ 57.193384] Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c5a.large/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017
> > [ 57.196272] Call Trace:
> > [ 57.197565] <TASK>
> > [ 57.198714] dump_stack_lvl+0x8f/0xc0
> > [ 57.200494] print_report+0x16c/0x4e0
> > [ 57.202084] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x76/0x130
> > [ 57.204077] kasan_report+0xc3/0xf0
> > [ 57.205587] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> > [ 57.207760] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x76/0x130
> > [ 57.209685] kasan_check_range+0x2d2/0x310
> > [ 57.211477] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x76/0x130
> > [ 57.213355] remove_wait_queue+0x25/0x130
> > [ 57.215102] ep_free+0x12d/0x220
> > [ 57.216506] ep_eventpoll_release+0x3c/0x40
> > [ 57.218254] __fput+0x32b/0x700
> > [ 57.221486] task_work_run+0x1db/0x230
> > [ 57.224885] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xfd/0x100
> > [ 57.228662] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40
> > [ 57.232360] do_syscall_64+0x52/0x90
> > [ 57.235691] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> > [ 57.239572] RIP: 0033:0x7fadf96e1c44
> > [ 57.242865] Code: 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff eb 9c b8 ff ff ff ff eb 95 e8 01 e2 01 00 90 8b 05 2a ac 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 11 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 3a f3 c3 48 83 ec 18 48 89 7c 24 08 e8 e4 a0
> > [ 57.255244] RSP: 002b:00007ffd1d1b7b98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
> > [ 57.261714] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fadf96e1c44
> > [ 57.266293] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd1d1b7b60 RDI: 0000000000000004
> > [ 57.270979] RBP: 00007ffd1d1b7bf0 R08: 00000000004007e0 R09: 00007fadf9a0f240
> > [ 57.275856] R10: 00000000000006ba R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004005e0
> > [ 57.280478] R13: 00007ffd1d1b7cd0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
> > [ 57.285059] </TASK>
> >
> > [ 57.290402] Allocated by task 2426:
> > [ 57.293705] kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x60
> > [ 57.297102] __kasan_kmalloc+0x85/0x90
> > [ 57.300491] psi_trigger_create+0x155/0x850
> > [ 57.304040] pressure_write+0x200/0x510
> > [ 57.307508] cgroup_file_write+0x1de/0x3e0
> > [ 57.310949] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x27d/0x380
> > [ 57.314601] vfs_write+0x7d7/0xaa0
> > [ 57.317891] ksys_write+0xd7/0x1a0
> > [ 57.321152] do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
> > [ 57.324496] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> >
> > [ 57.330887] Freed by task 2429:
> > [ 57.334053] kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x60
> > [ 57.337448] kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40
> > [ 57.340977] ____kasan_slab_free+0x11d/0x170
> > [ 57.344570] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x87/0x150
> > [ 57.348236] __kmem_cache_free+0xcb/0x180
> > [ 57.351710] psi_trigger_destroy+0x458/0x550
> > [ 57.355274] cgroup_file_release+0x96/0x110
> > [ 57.358779] kernfs_drain_open_files+0x238/0x420
> > [ 57.362519] kernfs_drain+0x191/0x2a0
> > [ 57.365901] __kernfs_remove+0x3a6/0x600
> > [ 57.369363] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc2/0x120
> > [ 57.373073] cgroup_addrm_files+0x90f/0xcf0
> > [ 57.376610] cgroup_destroy_locked+0x48a/0x730
> > [ 57.380260] cgroup_rmdir+0x2b/0x130
> > [ 57.383650] kernfs_iop_rmdir+0x17a/0x230
> > [ 57.387201] vfs_rmdir+0x196/0x410
> > [ 57.390442] do_rmdir+0x1c7/0x3f0
> > [ 57.393651] __x64_sys_rmdir+0x45/0x50
> > [ 57.397000] do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
> > [ 57.400340] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> >
> > [ 57.406689] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114976400
> > which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
> > [ 57.414907] The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of
> > 128-byte region [ffff888114976400, ffff888114976480)
> >
> > [ 57.425474] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
> > [ 57.429541] page:000000008c5ecb31 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x114976
> > [ 57.436725] flags: 0x2fffff80000200(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
> > [ 57.441235] raw: 002fffff80000200 ffff8881000418c0 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
> > [ 57.447793] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
> > [ 57.454274] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> >
> > [ 57.460990] Memory state around the buggy address:
> > [ 57.464744] ffff888114976300: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > [ 57.471126] ffff888114976380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > [ 57.477447] >ffff888114976400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > [ 57.483833] ^
> > [ 57.487541] ffff888114976480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > [ 57.493976] ffff888114976500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 fc fc
> >
> > Here is the simple repro.
> >
> > #include <fcntl.h>
> > #include <sys/epoll.h>
> > #include <unistd.h>
> >
> > int main(void)
> > {
> > const char trigger_str[] = "some 100000 1000000";
> > int fd, epfd;
> > struct epoll_event event;
> > struct epoll_event events[1];
> >
> > fd = open("/cgroup2/test/cpu.pressure", O_RDWR);
> > write(fd, trigger_str, sizeof(trigger_str));
> > epfd = epoll_create(1);
> > event.events = EPOLLPRI | EPOLLET;
> > event.data.fd = fd;
> > epoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, fd, &event);
> > epoll_wait(epfd, events, 1, -1); /* returns after rmdir */
> > sleep(5);
> > close(epfd);
> > close(fd);
> >
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > # mkdir /cgroup2
> > # mount -t cgroup2 none /cgroup2
> > # mkdir /cgroup2/test
> > # ./a.out &
> > # rmdir /cgroup2/test
> >
> > Looks like calling wake_up_pollfree() in psi_trigger_destroy() can properly
> > clear the queue and then avoid this use-after-free, but POLLFREE wasn't
> > considered enough there for the past similar issue[1]. While
> > wake_up_pollfree() could *also* be called in psi_trigger_destroy(), it may
> > be awkward and there can be more appropriate solution. It would be great if
> > experts could have a look.
>
> Thanks for your report.
>
> In the wakeup pattern below,
>
> cpu0 cpu2
> --- ---
> wake_up(&t->event_wait);
> HZ later
> kfree(t);
> HZ *3 later
> the last sleeper gets on CPU
> remove_wait_queue
>
> waker should wait for every sleeper to go off waitqueue.
>
> See if the diff below could survive your repro.
That patch survived the repro in my original post, however, the waker
(rmdir) was getting stuck until a file descriptor of the epoll instance or
the pressure file got closed. So, if the following modified repro runs
with the patch, the waker never returns (unless the sleeper gets killed)
while holding cgroup_mutex. This doesn't seem to be what you expected to
see with the patch, does it? Even wake_up_all() does not appear to empty
the queue, but wake_up_pollfree() does.
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
const char trigger_str[] = "some 100000 1000000";
int fd, epfd;
struct epoll_event event;
struct epoll_event events[1];
fd = open("/cgroup2/test/cpu.pressure", O_RDWR);
write(fd, trigger_str, sizeof(trigger_str));
epfd = epoll_create(1);
event.events = EPOLLPRI | EPOLLET;
event.data.fd = fd;
epoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, fd, &event);
epoll_wait(epfd, events, 1, -1);
pause();
return 0;
}
# mkdir /cgroup2
# mount -t cgroup2 none /cgroup2
# mkdir /cgroup2/test
# ./a.out &
# rmdir /cgroup2/test
# klilall a.out
Regards,
Munehisa
> Hillf
>
> --- mainline/kernel/sched/psi.c
> +++ y/kernel/sched/psi.c
> @@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ void psi_trigger_destroy(struct psi_trig
> * Wakeup waiters to stop polling. Can happen if cgroup is deleted
> * from under a polling process.
> */
> - wake_up_interruptible(&t->event_wait);
> + wake_up_all(&t->event_wait);
>
> mutex_lock(&group->trigger_lock);
>
> @@ -1394,6 +1394,10 @@ void psi_trigger_destroy(struct psi_trig
> kthread_stop(task_to_destroy);
> atomic_set(&group->poll_scheduled, 0);
> }
> +
> + while (wq_has_sleeper(&t->event_wait))
> + schedule_timeout_idle(HZ);
> +
> kfree(t);
> }
>
> --
>
>
