Re: [RFC] Expose a memory poison detector ioctl to user space.

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



> On 4/26/22 12:23, Jue Wang wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 11:18 AM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> I shouldn't speak for Intel as a whole, but I'll give you my personal
> perspective.
>
> Right now, hosts can't scan TDX private memory, period.  If you wanted
> to do scanning, the guest has to do it or you have to kill the guest and
> make the memory non-private.

Actually, afaiu, the host can read tdx private memory. This should NOT generate
#MC due to integrity/TD ownership but return a fixed value of "0"s. I do not 
know if this will also trigger #MCs due to memory errors.

>
> Going forward, guest memory scanning could be accomplished by allowing
> the VMM to migrate guest pages.  Let's say you want to scan page "A",
> you could move A->B and B->A.  That would certainly touch the page.
> This would need to be implemented in the TDX module.

TDH.MEM.PAGE.RELOCATE should be able to migrate guest pages but I am not sure 
if this would be feasible depending on how often we keep relocating pages.




[Index of Archives]     [Linux ARM Kernel]     [Linux ARM]     [Linux Omap]     [Fedora ARM]     [IETF Annouce]     [Bugtraq]     [Linux OMAP]     [Linux MIPS]     [eCos]     [Asterisk Internet PBX]     [Linux API]

  Powered by Linux