On 05.05.20 16:34, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 5/5/20 7:31 AM, Christian Borntraeger wrote: >>> So, the requirements are: >>> >>> 1. Allow host-side DMA and CPU access to shared pages >>> 2. Stop host-side DMA and CPU access to encrypted pages >>> 3. Allow pages to be converted between the states at the request of the >>> guest >>> >>> Stopping the DMA is pretty easy, even across the gazillions of drivers >>> in the tree because even random ethernet drivers do stuff like: >>> >>> txdr->buffer_info[i].dma = >>> dma_map_single(&pdev->dev, skb->data, skb->len, >>> DMA_TO_DEVICE); >>> >>> So the DMA can be stopped at the mapping layer. It's a *LOT* easier to >>> catch there since the IOMMUs already provide isolation between the I/O >>> and CPU address spaces. >> And your problem is that the guest could convert this after the dma_map? >> So you looked into our code if this would help? > > Yep, it seemed like a close-enough problem. Is there a way to prevent the guest from switching the state? We also have 2 variants of secure pages 1. those that are secure and when the host accesses them will be encrypted 2. those that are marked by the guest as shared. When you look at arch_make_page_accessible we first try to "pin" the shared state. So the guest trying to "unshare" such a page would trigger an exit that we can handle.
