On 1/30/20 12:17 PM, vjitta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote: > From: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Random sequence cache is precomputed during slab object creation > based up on the object size and no of objects per slab. These could > be changed when flags like SLAB_STORE_USER, SLAB_POISON are updated > from sysfs. So when shuffle_freelist is called during slab_alloc it > uses updated object count to access the precomputed random sequence > cache. This could result in incorrect access of the random sequence > cache which could further result in slab corruption. Fix this by > reinitializing the random sequence cache up on slab object update. > > A sample panic trace when write to slab_store_user was attempted. A more complete oops report would have been better, e.g. if anyone was googling it, to find this patch. Also I was checking where else calculate_sizes() is called and found order_store(). So if somebody changes (especially increases) the order, shouldn't the reinitialization also be done? This is even more nasty as it doesn't seem to require that no objects exist. Also there is no synchronization against concurrent allocations/frees? Gasp.
