>> It appears that stack overflows are *not* detected when KASAN_VMALLOC
>> and VMAP_STACK are enabled.
>>
>> Tested with:
>> insmod drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.ko cpoint_name=DIRECT cpoint_type=EXHAUST_STACK
>>
>> I've also attached the .config. Anything I missed?
>>
So this is a pretty fun bug.
>From qemu it seems that CPU#0 is stuck in
queued_spin_lock_slowpath. Some registers contain the address of
logbuf_lock. Looking at a stack in crash, we're printing:
crash> bt -S 0xffffc90000530000 695
PID: 695 TASK: ffff888069933b00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "modprobe"
#0 [ffffc90000530000] __schedule at ffffffff834832e5
#1 [ffffc900005300d0] vscnprintf at ffffffff83464398
#2 [ffffc900005300f8] vprintk_store at ffffffff8123d9f0
#3 [ffffc90000530160] vprintk_emit at ffffffff8123e2f9
#4 [ffffc900005301b0] vprintk_func at ffffffff8123ff06
#5 [ffffc900005301c8] printk at ffffffff8123efb0
#6 [ffffc90000530278] recursive_loop at ffffffffc0459939 [lkdtm]
#7 [ffffc90000530708] recursive_loop at ffffffffc045994a [lkdtm]
#8 [ffffc90000530b98] recursive_loop at ffffffffc045994a [lkdtm]
...
We seem to be deadlocking on logbuf_lock because we take the stack
overflow inside printk after it takes the lock, as recursive_loop
attempts to print its status. Then we try to printk() some information
about the double-fault, which tries to take the lock again, and blam,
we're deadlocked.
I didn't see it in my build because I happen to just access the stack
differently with lock debugging on - we happen to overflow the stack
while not holding the lock.
So I think this is a generic bug, not related to KASAN_VMALLOC. IIUC,
it's not safe to kill stack-overflowing tasks with die() because they
could be holding arbitrary locks. Instead we should panic() the box.
(panic prints without taking locks.)
The following patch works for me, does it fix things for you?
-----------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 4bb0f8447112..bfb0ec667c09 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -301,13 +301,14 @@ __visible void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long fault_address)
{
- printk(KERN_EMERG "BUG: stack guard page was hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)\n",
- (void *)fault_address, current->stack,
- (char *)current->stack + THREAD_SIZE - 1);
- die(message, regs, 0);
+ /*
+ * It's not safe to kill the task, as it's in kernel space and
+ * might be holding important locks. Just panic.
+ */
- /* Be absolutely certain we don't return. */
- panic("%s", message);
+ panic("%s - stack guard page was hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)",
+ message, (void *)fault_address, current->stack,
+ (char *)current->stack + THREAD_SIZE - 1);
}
-----------------------------------------------------
Regards,
Daniel
>
> Fascinating - it seems to work on my config, a lightly modified
> defconfig (attached):
>
> [ 111.287854] lkdtm: loop 46/64 ...
> [ 111.287856] lkdtm: loop 45/64 ...
> [ 111.287859] lkdtm: loop 44/64 ...
> [ 111.287862] lkdtm: loop 43/64 ...
> [ 111.287864] lkdtm: loop 42/64 ...
> [ 111.287867] lkdtm: loop 41/64 ...
> [ 111.287869] lkdtm: loop 40/64 ...
> [ 111.288498] BUG: stack guard page was hit at 000000007bf6ef1a (stack is 000000005952e5cc..00000000ba40316c)
> [ 111.288499] kernel stack overflow (double-fault): 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
> [ 111.288500] CPU: 0 PID: 767 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.3.0-rc1-next-20190723+ #91
> [ 111.288501] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
> [ 111.288501] RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x43/0x3b50
> [ 111.288503] Code: 84 24 90 00 00 00 48 c7 84 24 90 00 00 00 b3 8a b5 41 48 8b 9c 24 28 01 00 00 48 c7 84 24 98 00 00 00 f8
> 5a a9 84 48 c1 e8 03 <48> 89 44 24 18 48 89 c7 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c7 84 24
> [ 111.288504] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a37fd8 EFLAGS: 00010802
> [ 111.288505] RAX: 1ffff9200014700d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
> [ 111.288506] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff84cf3ff8
> [ 111.288507] RBP: ffffffff84cf3ff8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
> [ 111.288507] R10: fffffbfff0a440cf R11: ffffffff8522067f R12: 0000000000000000
> [ 111.288508] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
> [ 111.288509] FS: 00007f97f1f23740(0000) GS:ffff88806c400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [ 111.288510] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [ 111.288510] CR2: ffffc90000a37fc8 CR3: 000000006a0fc005 CR4: 0000000000360ef0
> [ 111.288511] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> [ 111.288512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> [ 111.288512] Call Trace:
> [ 111.288513] lock_acquire+0x125/0x300
> [ 111.288513] ? vprintk_emit+0x6c/0x250
> [ 111.288514] _raw_spin_lock+0x20/0x30
>
> I will test with your config and see if I can narrow it down tomorrow.
>
> Regards,
> Daniel
>
>
>
>> Thanks,
>> -- Marco
>>
>>> > > ---
>>> > > Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> > > include/linux/kasan.h | 16 +++++++++
>>> > > lib/Kconfig.kasan | 16 +++++++++
>>> > > lib/test_kasan.c | 26 ++++++++++++++
>>> > > mm/kasan/common.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> > > mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 3 ++
>>> > > mm/kasan/kasan.h | 1 +
>>> > > mm/vmalloc.c | 15 +++++++-
>>> > > 8 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>> > >
>>> > > diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
>>> > > index b72d07d70239..35fda484a672 100644
>>> > > --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
>>> > > +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
>>> > > @@ -215,3 +215,63 @@ brk handler is used to print bug reports.
>>> > > A potential expansion of this mode is a hardware tag-based mode, which would
>>> > > use hardware memory tagging support instead of compiler instrumentation and
>>> > > manual shadow memory manipulation.
>>> > > +
>>> > > +What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN?
>>> > > +--------------------------------------------
>>> > > +
>>> > > +The kernel maps memory in a number of different parts of the address
>>> > > +space. This poses something of a problem for KASAN, which requires
>>> > > +that all addresses accessed by instrumented code have a valid shadow
>>> > > +region.
>>> > > +
>>> > > +The range of kernel virtual addresses is large: there is not enough
>>> > > +real memory to support a real shadow region for every address that
>>> > > +could be accessed by the kernel.
>>> > > +
>>> > > +By default
>>> > > +~~~~~~~~~~
>>> > > +
>>> > > +By default, architectures only map real memory over the shadow region
>>> > > +for the linear mapping (and potentially other small areas). For all
>>> > > +other areas - such as vmalloc and vmemmap space - a single read-only
>>> > > +page is mapped over the shadow area. This read-only shadow page
>>> > > +declares all memory accesses as permitted.
>>> > > +
>>> > > +This presents a problem for modules: they do not live in the linear
>>> > > +mapping, but in a dedicated module space. By hooking in to the module
>>> > > +allocator, KASAN can temporarily map real shadow memory to cover
>>> > > +them. This allows detection of invalid accesses to module globals, for
>>> > > +example.
>>> > > +
>>> > > +This also creates an incompatibility with ``VMAP_STACK``: if the stack
>>> > > +lives in vmalloc space, it will be shadowed by the read-only page, and
>>> > > +the kernel will fault when trying to set up the shadow data for stack
>>> > > +variables.
>>> > > +
>>> > > +CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
>>> > > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>>> > > +
>>> > > +With ``CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC``, KASAN can cover vmalloc space at the
>>> > > +cost of greater memory usage. Currently this is only supported on x86.
>>> > > +
>>> > > +This works by hooking into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically
>>> > > +allocating real shadow memory to back the mappings.
>>> > > +
>>> > > +Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
>>> > > +page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
>>> > > +therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
>>> > > +use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
>>> > > +``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``.
>>> > > +
>>> > > +Instead, we share backing space across multiple mappings. We allocate
>>> > > +a backing page the first time a mapping in vmalloc space uses a
>>> > > +particular page of the shadow region. We keep this page around
>>> > > +regardless of whether the mapping is later freed - in the mean time
>>> > > +this page could have become shared by another vmalloc mapping.
>>> > > +
>>> > > +This can in theory lead to unbounded memory growth, but the vmalloc
>>> > > +allocator is pretty good at reusing addresses, so the practical memory
>>> > > +usage grows at first but then stays fairly stable.
>>> > > +
>>> > > +This allows ``VMAP_STACK`` support on x86, and enables support of
>>> > > +architectures that do not have a fixed module region.
>>> > > diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
>>> > > index cc8a03cc9674..fcabc5a03fca 100644
>>> > > --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
>>> > > +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
>>> > > @@ -70,8 +70,18 @@ struct kasan_cache {
>>> > > int free_meta_offset;
>>> > > };
>>> > >
>>> > > +/*
>>> > > + * These functions provide a special case to support backing module
>>> > > + * allocations with real shadow memory. With KASAN vmalloc, the special
>>> > > + * case is unnecessary, as the work is handled in the generic case.
>>> > > + */
>>> > > +#ifndef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
>>> > > int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size);
>>> > > void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm);
>>> > > +#else
>>> > > +static inline int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size) { return 0; }
>>> > > +static inline void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm) {}
>>> > > +#endif
>>> > >
>>> > > int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size);
>>> > > void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size);
>>> > > @@ -194,4 +204,10 @@ static inline void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
>>> > >
>>> > > #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
>>> > >
>>> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
>>> > > +void kasan_cover_vmalloc(unsigned long requested_size, struct vm_struct *area);
>>> > > +#else
>>> > > +static inline void kasan_cover_vmalloc(unsigned long requested_size, struct vm_struct *area) {}
>>> > > +#endif
>>> > > +
>>> > > #endif /* LINUX_KASAN_H */
>>> > > diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
>>> > > index 4fafba1a923b..a320dc2e9317 100644
>>> > > --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
>>> > > +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
>>> > > @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
>>> > > config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS
>>> > > bool
>>> > >
>>> > > +config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC
>>> > > + bool
>>> > > +
>>> > > config CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC
>>> > > def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address)
>>> > >
>>> > > @@ -135,6 +138,19 @@ config KASAN_S390_4_LEVEL_PAGING
>>> > > to 3TB of RAM with KASan enabled). This options allows to force
>>> > > 4-level paging instead.
>>> > >
>>> > > +config KASAN_VMALLOC
>>> > > + bool "Back mappings in vmalloc space with real shadow memory"
>>> > > + depends on KASAN && HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC
>>> > > + help
>>> > > + By default, the shadow region for vmalloc space is the read-only
>>> > > + zero page. This means that KASAN cannot detect errors involving
>>> > > + vmalloc space.
>>> > > +
>>> > > + Enabling this option will hook in to vmap/vmalloc and back those
>>> > > + mappings with real shadow memory allocated on demand. This allows
>>> > > + for KASAN to detect more sorts of errors (and to support vmapped
>>> > > + stacks), but at the cost of higher memory usage.
>>> > > +
>>> > > config TEST_KASAN
>>> > > tristate "Module for testing KASAN for bug detection"
>>> > > depends on m && KASAN
>>> > > diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
>>> > > index b63b367a94e8..d375246f5f96 100644
>>> > > --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
>>> > > +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
>>> > > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
>>> > > #include <linux/slab.h>
>>> > > #include <linux/string.h>
>>> > > #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>>> > > +#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>>> > >
>>> > > /*
>>> > > * Note: test functions are marked noinline so that their names appear in
>>> > > @@ -709,6 +710,30 @@ static noinline void __init kmalloc_double_kzfree(void)
>>> > > kzfree(ptr);
>>> > > }
>>> > >
>>> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
>>> > > +static noinline void __init vmalloc_oob(void)
>>> > > +{
>>> > > + void *area;
>>> > > +
>>> > > + pr_info("vmalloc out-of-bounds\n");
>>> > > +
>>> > > + /*
>>> > > + * We have to be careful not to hit the guard page.
>>> > > + * The MMU will catch that and crash us.
>>> > > + */
>>> > > + area = vmalloc(3000);
>>> > > + if (!area) {
>>> > > + pr_err("Allocation failed\n");
>>> > > + return;
>>> > > + }
>>> > > +
>>> > > + ((volatile char *)area)[3100];
>>> > > + vfree(area);
>>> > > +}
>>> > > +#else
>>> > > +static void __init vmalloc_oob(void) {}
>>> > > +#endif
>>> > > +
>>> > > static int __init kmalloc_tests_init(void)
>>> > > {
>>> > > /*
>>> > > @@ -752,6 +777,7 @@ static int __init kmalloc_tests_init(void)
>>> > > kasan_strings();
>>> > > kasan_bitops();
>>> > > kmalloc_double_kzfree();
>>> > > + vmalloc_oob();
>>> > >
>>> > > kasan_restore_multi_shot(multishot);
>>> > >
>>> > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
>>> > > index 2277b82902d8..a3bb84efccbf 100644
>>> > > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
>>> > > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
>>> > > @@ -568,6 +568,7 @@ void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
>>> > > /* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */
>>> > > }
>>> > >
>>> > > +#ifndef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
>>> > > int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size)
>>> > > {
>>> > > void *ret;
>>> > > @@ -603,6 +604,7 @@ void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm)
>>> > > if (vm->flags & VM_KASAN)
>>> > > vfree(kasan_mem_to_shadow(vm->addr));
>>> > > }
>>> > > +#endif
>>> > >
>>> > > extern void __kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write, unsigned long ip);
>>> > >
>>> > > @@ -722,3 +724,52 @@ static int __init kasan_memhotplug_init(void)
>>> > >
>>> > > core_initcall(kasan_memhotplug_init);
>>> > > #endif
>>> > > +
>>> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
>>> > > +void kasan_cover_vmalloc(unsigned long requested_size, struct vm_struct *area)
>>> > > +{
>>> > > + unsigned long shadow_alloc_start, shadow_alloc_end;
>>> > > + unsigned long addr;
>>> > > + unsigned long backing;
>>> > > + pgd_t *pgdp;
>>> > > + p4d_t *p4dp;
>>> > > + pud_t *pudp;
>>> > > + pmd_t *pmdp;
>>> > > + pte_t *ptep;
>>> > > + pte_t backing_pte;
>>> > > +
>>> > > + shadow_alloc_start = ALIGN_DOWN(
>>> > > + (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(area->addr),
>>> > > + PAGE_SIZE);
>>> > > + shadow_alloc_end = ALIGN(
>>> > > + (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(area->addr + area->size),
>>> > > + PAGE_SIZE);
>>> > > +
>>> > > + addr = shadow_alloc_start;
>>> > > + do {
>>> > > + pgdp = pgd_offset_k(addr);
>>> > > + p4dp = p4d_alloc(&init_mm, pgdp, addr);
>>> >
>>> > Page table allocations will be protected by mm->page_table_lock, right?
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > > + pudp = pud_alloc(&init_mm, p4dp, addr);
>>> > > + pmdp = pmd_alloc(&init_mm, pudp, addr);
>>> > > + ptep = pte_alloc_kernel(pmdp, addr);
>>> > > +
>>> > > + /*
>>> > > + * we can validly get here if pte is not none: it means we
>>> > > + * allocated this page earlier to use part of it for another
>>> > > + * allocation
>>> > > + */
>>> > > + if (pte_none(*ptep)) {
>>> > > + backing = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
>>> > > + backing_pte = pfn_pte(PFN_DOWN(__pa(backing)),
>>> > > + PAGE_KERNEL);
>>> > > + set_pte_at(&init_mm, addr, ptep, backing_pte);
>>> > > + }
>>> > > + } while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != shadow_alloc_end);
>>> > > +
>>> > > + requested_size = round_up(requested_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
>>> > > + kasan_unpoison_shadow(area->addr, requested_size);
>>> > > + kasan_poison_shadow(area->addr + requested_size,
>>> > > + area->size - requested_size,
>>> > > + KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Do I read this correctly that if kernel code does vmalloc(64), they
>>> > will have exactly 64 bytes available rather than full page? To make
>>> > sure: vmalloc does not guarantee that the available size is rounded up
>>> > to page size? I suspect we will see a throw out of new bugs related to
>>> > OOBs on vmalloc memory. So I want to make sure that these will be
>>> > indeed bugs that we agree need to be fixed.
>>> > I am sure there will be bugs where the size is controlled by
>>> > user-space, so these are bad bugs under any circumstances. But there
>>> > will also probably be OOBs, where people will try to "prove" that
>>> > that's fine and will work (just based on our previous experiences :)).
>>> >
>>> > On impl side: kasan_unpoison_shadow seems to be capable of handling
>>> > non-KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE-aligned sizes exactly in the way we want.
>>> > So I think it's better to do:
>>> >
>>> > kasan_unpoison_shadow(area->addr, requested_size);
>>> > requested_size = round_up(requested_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
>>> > kasan_poison_shadow(area->addr + requested_size,
>>> > area->size - requested_size,
>>> > KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > > +}
>>> > > +#endif
>>> > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
>>> > > index 36c645939bc9..2d97efd4954f 100644
>>> > > --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
>>> > > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
>>> > > @@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
>>> > > case KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT:
>>> > > bug_type = "alloca-out-of-bounds";
>>> > > break;
>>> > > + case KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID:
>>> > > + bug_type = "vmalloc-out-of-bounds";
>>> > > + break;
>>> > > }
>>> > >
>>> > > return bug_type;
>>> > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
>>> > > index 014f19e76247..8b1f2fbc780b 100644
>>> > > --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
>>> > > +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
>>> > > @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
>>> > > #endif
>>> > >
>>> > > #define KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE 0xFA /* redzone for global variable */
>>> > > +#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID 0xF9 /* unallocated space in vmapped page */
>>> > >
>>> > > /*
>>> > > * Stack redzone shadow values
>>> > > diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
>>> > > index 4fa8d84599b0..8cbcb5056c9b 100644
>>> > > --- a/mm/vmalloc.c
>>> > > +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
>>> > > @@ -2012,6 +2012,15 @@ static void setup_vmalloc_vm(struct vm_struct *vm, struct vmap_area *va,
>>> > > va->vm = vm;
>>> > > va->flags |= VM_VM_AREA;
>>> > > spin_unlock(&vmap_area_lock);
>>> > > +
>>> > > + /*
>>> > > + * If we are in vmalloc space we need to cover the shadow area with
>>> > > + * real memory. If we come here through VM_ALLOC, this is done
>>> > > + * by a higher level function that has access to the true size,
>>> > > + * which might not be a full page.
>>> > > + */
>>> > > + if (is_vmalloc_addr(vm->addr) && !(vm->flags & VM_ALLOC))
>>> > > + kasan_cover_vmalloc(vm->size, vm);
>>> > > }
>>> > >
>>> > > static void clear_vm_uninitialized_flag(struct vm_struct *vm)
>>> > > @@ -2483,6 +2492,8 @@ void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
>>> > > if (!addr)
>>> > > return NULL;
>>> > >
>>> > > + kasan_cover_vmalloc(real_size, area);
>>> > > +
>>> > > /*
>>> > > * In this function, newly allocated vm_struct has VM_UNINITIALIZED
>>> > > * flag. It means that vm_struct is not fully initialized.
>>> > > @@ -3324,9 +3335,11 @@ struct vm_struct **pcpu_get_vm_areas(const unsigned long *offsets,
>>> > > spin_unlock(&vmap_area_lock);
>>> > >
>>> > > /* insert all vm's */
>>> > > - for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++)
>>> > > + for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++) {
>>> > > setup_vmalloc_vm(vms[area], vas[area], VM_ALLOC,
>>> > > pcpu_get_vm_areas);
>>> > > + kasan_cover_vmalloc(sizes[area], vms[area]);
>>> > > + }
>>> > >
>>> > > kfree(vas);
>>> > > return vms;
>>> > > --
>>> > > 2.20.1
>>> > >
>>> > > --
>>> > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "kasan-dev" group.
>>> > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to kasan-dev+unsubscribe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
>>> > > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/kasan-dev/20190725055503.19507-2-dja%40axtens.net.
