Hi Michael, On Wed, May 21, 2014 at 20:12 +0200, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote: > Vasily (and Motohiro), > > Sometime ago, Motohiro raised a documentation bug > ( https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42704 ) which > relates to your commit 72fa59970f8698023045ab0713d66f3f4f96945c > ("move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common()") > > I have attempted to document this, and I would like to ask you > (and Motohiro) if you would review the text proposed below for > the exceve(2) man page. > > Thank you, > > Michael > > > ERRORS > EAGAIN (since Linux 3.1) > Having changed its real UID using one of the set*uid() > calls, the caller was—and is now still—above its > RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit (see setrlimit(2)). For a > more detailed explanation of this error, see NOTES. > > NOTES > execve() and EAGAIN > A more detailed explanation of the EAGAIN error that can occur > (since Linux 3.1) when calling execve() is as follows. > > The EAGAIN error can occur when a preceding call to setuid(2), > setreuid(2), or setresuid(2) caused the real user ID of the > process to change, and that change caused the process to > exceed its RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit (i.e., the number of > processes belonging to the new real UID exceeds the resource > limit). In Linux 3.0 and earlier, this caused the set*uid() > call to fail. > > Since Linux 3.1, the scenario just described no longer causes > the set*uid() call to fail, because it too often led to secu‐ > rity holes because buggy applications didn't check the return > status and assumed that—if the caller had root privileges—the > call would always succeed. Instead, the set*uid() calls now > successfully change real UID, but the kernel sets an internal > flag, named PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED, to note that the RLIMIT_NPROC > resource limit has been exceeded. If the resource limit is > still exceeded at the time of a subsequent execve() call, that > call fails with the error EAGAIN. This kernel logic ensures > that the RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit is still enforced for the > common privileged daemon workflow—namely, fork(2)+ set*uid()+ > execve(2). > > If the resource limit was not still exceeded at the time of > the execve() call (because other processes belonging to this > real UID terminated between the set*uid() call and the > execve() call), then the execve() call succeeds and the kernel > clears the PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag. The flag is also > cleared if a subsequent call to fork(2) by this process suc‐ > ceeds. Probably explicitly state that NPROC check on execve() is processed only in case of a previous set*uid() call? If there was no previous set*uid() call the semantics of execve() checks are the same as before (IOW, RLIMIT_NPROC is ignored). The rest is fine. Thanks! -- Vasily Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
