On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 2:55 PM, Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500 > Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> >> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc) >> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of >> subverting privileged binaries. > > The changelog doesn't explain the semantics of the new syscall. > There's a comment way-down-there which I guess suffices, if you hunt > for it. I'll bubble up luto's comment into the changelog when I resend the grand-unified-patchset. > And the changelog doesn't explain why this is being added. Presumably > seccomp_filter wants/needs this feature but whowhatwherewhenwhy? Spell > it all out, please. I'll try my hand at that and luto@ can yell at me if I misrepresent. Seem reasonable? > The new syscall mode will be documented in the prctl manpage. Please > cc linux-man@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and work with Michael on getting this > done? I'll add linux-man to the patch series since this applies to both no_new_privs and seccomp filter. Thanks! >> >> ... >> -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
