On Tue, Nov 19, 2024 at 1:23 PM Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 19, 2024 at 10:08:36AM -0500, Pasha Tatashin wrote: > > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 8:09 PM Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 05:08:42PM -0500, Pasha Tatashin wrote: > > > > Additionally, using crash/drgn is not feasible for us at this time, it > > > > requires keeping external tools on our hosts, also it requires > > > > approval and a security review for each script before deployment in > > > > our fleet. > > > > > > So it's ok to add a totally insecure kernel feature to your fleet > > > instead? You might want to reconsider that policy decision :) > > > > Hi Greg, > > > > While some risk is inherent, we believe the potential for abuse here > > is limited, especially given the existing CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement. > > But, even with root access compromised, this tool presents a smaller > > attack surface than alternatives like crash/drgn. It exposes less > > sensitive information, unlike crash/drgn, which could potentially > > allow reading all of kernel memory. > > The problem here is with using dmesg for output. No security-sensitive > information should go there. Even exposing raw kernel pointers is not > considered safe. I am OK in writing the output to a debugfs file in the next version, the only concern I have is that implies that dump_page() would need to be basically duplicated, as it now outputs everything via printk's.
