On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 8:09 PM Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 05:08:42PM -0500, Pasha Tatashin wrote: > > Additionally, using crash/drgn is not feasible for us at this time, it > > requires keeping external tools on our hosts, also it requires > > approval and a security review for each script before deployment in > > our fleet. > > So it's ok to add a totally insecure kernel feature to your fleet > instead? You might want to reconsider that policy decision :) Hi Greg, While some risk is inherent, we believe the potential for abuse here is limited, especially given the existing CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement. But, even with root access compromised, this tool presents a smaller attack surface than alternatives like crash/drgn. It exposes less sensitive information, unlike crash/drgn, which could potentially allow reading all of kernel memory. Pasha
