On 11/3/21 4:44 AM, David Ahern wrote:
On 11/1/21 10:34 AM, Leonard Crestez wrote:
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index 96a29caf56c7..68f9545e4347 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -902,13 +902,37 @@ static void tcp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32
struct sock *ctl_sk = net->ipv6.tcp_sk;
unsigned int tot_len = sizeof(struct tcphdr);
__be32 mrst = 0, *topt;
struct dst_entry *dst;
__u32 mark = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+ struct tcp_authopt_info *authopt_info = NULL;
+ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *authopt_key_info = NULL;
+ u8 authopt_rnextkeyid;
+#endif
if (tsecr)
tot_len += TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED;
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
I realize MD5 is done this way, but new code can always strive to be
better. Put this and the one below in helpers such that this logic is in
the authopt.h file and the intrusion here is a one liner that either
compiles in or out based on the config setting.
It's not very easy to separate the AO-specific parts here. Key lookup
determines packet allocation length and whether MD5 should also be
attempted (RFC claims adding both is invalid). The result of the key
lookup is the used later to sign bits of the packet.
The IPv4 equivalent is even worse because no explicit reply SKB is
allocated.
I can try to split tcp_authopt_pick_key_for_response_v6 and
tcp_authopt_sign_response_v6.
+ /* Key lookup before SKB allocation */
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_authopt_needed) && sk) {
+ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
+ authopt_info = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_authopt_info;
+ else
+ authopt_info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info);
+
+ if (authopt_info) {
+ authopt_key_info = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, authopt_info, sk,
+ &authopt_rnextkeyid);
+ if (authopt_key_info) {
+ tot_len += TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT;
+ /* Don't use MD5 */
+ key = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
if (key)
tot_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED;
#endif
@@ -961,10 +985,24 @@ static void tcp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32
tcp_v6_md5_hash_hdr((__u8 *)topt, key,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, t1);
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+ /* Compute the TCP-AO mac. Unlike in the ipv4 case we have a real SKB */
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_authopt_needed) && authopt_key_info) {
+ *topt++ = htonl((TCPOPT_AUTHOPT << 24) |
+ (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT << 16) |
+ (authopt_key_info->send_id << 8) |
+ (authopt_rnextkeyid));
+ tcp_authopt_hash((char *)topt,
+ authopt_key_info,
+ authopt_info,
+ (struct sock *)sk,
+ buff);
+ }
+#endif
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.daddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
fl6.saddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = label;
