When a policy rule uses the appraise_hash option, appraisal of a
file referenced by that rule will now fail if the digest algorithm
employed to hash the file was not one of those explicitly listed
in the option. In its absence, any hash algorithm compiled in the
kernel will be accepted.
For example, on a system where SELinux is properly deployed, the rule
appraise func=BPRM_CHECK obj_type=iptables_exec_t appraise_hash=sha256,sha384
will block the execution of iptables if the xattr security.ima of its
executables were not hashed with either sha256 or sha384.
Signed-off-by: Simon Thoby <simon.thoby@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 ++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 8 ++++++--
5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 049748e3fe9b..7ef1b214d358 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *func_data);
+ const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_hashes);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *func_data);
+ const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_hashes);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index d8e321cc6936..c91c2c402498 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
* @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
+ * @allowed_hashes: whitelist of hash algorithms allowed for the IMA xattr
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -188,14 +189,15 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *func_data)
+ const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_hashes)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
- flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data);
+ flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
+ allowed_hashes);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index e9a24acf25c6..b0856c4bf515 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -77,8 +77,9 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
return 0;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func,
- mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid,
+ func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 287b90509006..d7289164807e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
int xattr_len = 0;
bool violation_check;
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+ unsigned int appraisal_allowed_hashes = 0;
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
@@ -219,7 +220,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid,
- mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL);
+ mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
+ &appraisal_allowed_hashes);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -327,6 +329,20 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
+ /* Ensure that the digest was generated using an allowed algorithm */
+ if (appraisal_allowed_hashes &&
+ !(appraisal_allowed_hashes & (1U << hash_algo))) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+
+ if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
+ pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
+
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, file_inode(file),
+ pathname, "collect_data", "forbidden-hash-algorithm", rc, 0);
+
+ goto out_locked;
+ }
+
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
goto out_locked;
@@ -433,7 +449,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
- &pcr, &template, NULL);
+ &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -882,7 +898,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
- func_data);
+ func_data, NULL);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 1b6c00baa397..260b3b0520cc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -657,6 +657,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
* @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
+ * @allowed_hashes: whitelist of hash algorithms allowed for the IMA xattr
*
* Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
* conditions.
@@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *func_data)
+ const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_hashes)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -695,8 +696,11 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
action &= ~IMA_HASH;
if (ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs)
action |= IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS;
- }
+ if (allowed_hashes &&
+ entry->flags & IMA_VALIDATE_HASH)
+ *allowed_hashes = entry->allowed_hashes;
+ }
if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
--
2.31.1
