By default, writes of the extended attributes security.ima will be
forbidden if the xattr value uses a hash algorithm not compiled in the
kernel. Disabling weak hashes when building the kernel will thus prevent
their use in IMA (these hashes will not only be blocked for setxattr,
but they won't be allowed for measurement/appraisal either as the kernel
will obviously not be able to measure files hashed with them). Note
however that CONFIG_IMA depends on CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5 and
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1, so this limits the security benefits of this
measure.
To bypass that limitation, if secure boot is enabled on the system,
the allowed algorithms are further restricted: only writes performed
with the algorithm specified in the ima_hash parameter (defined at
build-time with CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH or overwritten with a boot
cmdline option) are allowed.
Signed-off-by: Simon Thoby <simon.thoby@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index ef9dcfce45d4..e9a24acf25c6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -575,6 +575,54 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
}
+/**
+ * ima_setxattr_validate_hash_alg
+ *
+ * Called when the user tries to write the security.ima xattr.
+ * The xattr value maps to the hash algorithm hash_alg, and this function
+ * returns whether this setxattr should be allowed, emitting an audit
+ * message if necessary.
+ */
+int ima_setxattr_validate_hash_alg(struct dentry *dentry,
+ const void *xattr_value,
+ size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+ int res = -EACCES;
+ char *path = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
+ enum hash_algo hash_alg =
+ ima_get_hash_algo((struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)xattr_value,
+ xattr_value_len);
+
+ /**
+ * When secure boot is enabled, only accept the IMA xattr if
+ * hashed with the same algorithm as defined in the ima_hash
+ * parameter (just like the 'ima_appraise' cmdline parameter
+ * is ignored if secure boot is enabled)
+ */
+ if (arch_ima_get_secureboot() && hash_alg != ima_hash_algo)
+ goto out_warn;
+
+ /* disallow xattr writes with algorithms not built in the kernel */
+ if (hash_alg != ima_hash_algo
+ && !crypto_has_alg(hash_algo_name[hash_alg], 0, 0))
+ goto out_warn;
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_warn:
+ pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+ /* no memory available ? no file path for you */
+ if (pathbuf)
+ path = dentry_path(dentry, pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
+
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, d_inode(dentry),
+ path, "collect_data", "forbidden-hash-algorithm", res, 0);
+
+ kfree(pathbuf);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
@@ -592,6 +640,12 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG);
}
if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) {
+ /* the user-supplied xattr must use an allowed hash algo */
+ int rc = ima_setxattr_validate_hash_alg(dentry, xattr_value,
+ xattr_value_len);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
if (result == 1)
result = 0;
--
2.31.1
