On 2/1/21 8:31 PM, Vitaly Chikunov wrote:
On Mon, Feb 01, 2021 at 05:10:59PM +0800, Tianjia Zhang wrote:
On 2/1/21 2:52 AM, Vitaly Chikunov wrote:
Tianjia,
On Sun, Jan 31, 2021 at 08:56:23PM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote:
On Sun, Jan 31, 2021 at 08:48:46PM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote:
On Sun, Jan 31, 2021 at 11:27:21AM +0800, Tianjia Zhang wrote:
The combination of SM2 and SM3 algorithms has been implemented in the
kernel. At present, the ima-evm-utils signature tool does not support
this combination of algorithms. This is because SM2 sign require a
USERID, which requires the use of a higher-level sign functions of
OpenSSL. this patch use the EVP_DigestSign series of functions to
sign to support various signature algorithm combinations.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
src/libimaevm.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/libimaevm.c b/src/libimaevm.c
index fa6c278..89b9b88 100644
--- a/src/libimaevm.c
+++ b/src/libimaevm.c
@@ -891,6 +891,7 @@ static int sign_hash_v2(const char *algo, const unsigned char *hash,
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
char name[20];
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
const EVP_MD *md;
size_t sigsize;
const char *st;
@@ -932,24 +933,47 @@ static int sign_hash_v2(const char *algo, const unsigned char *hash,
return -1;
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000
Perhaps, this check is not needed at all if it isn't enabled for new
openssl?
+ /*
+ * SM2 and SM3 should go together. If SM3 hash algorithm and EC private
+ * key are used at the same time, check whether it is SM2 private key.
+ */
+ if (hdr->hash_algo == PKEY_HASH_SM3_256 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+ int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+ if (curve == NID_sm2)
Also, this patch does not compile on openssl 1.1.0 because
NID_sm2 and EVP_PKEY_SM2 are not defined.
OPENSSL 1.1.0 version does not support SM2, the macro detection of
OPENSSL_VERSION should be added here.
Or just #ifdef EVP_PKEY_SM2.
+ EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_SM2);
+ }
+#endif
+
calc_keyid_v2(&keyid, name, pkey);
hdr->keyid = keyid;
st = "EVP_PKEY_CTX_new";
if (!(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)))
goto err;
- st = "EVP_PKEY_sign_init";
- if (!EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx))
+ st = "EVP_MD_CTX_new";
+ if (!(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()))
goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_SM2) {
+ st = "EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id";
+ /* Set SM2 default userid */
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(ctx, "1234567812345678", 16))
You cannot call EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id for EVP_PKEY_sign's ctx?
I don't really get the API change. Can you explain more this
requirement?
EVP_PKEY_sign should be able to sign with any algo, unless there is
openssl bug. Is there bug preventing SM2 signing with EVP_PKEY_sign?
The SM2 signature is different from the conventional signature algorithm.
For example, to sign a message, not the hash signature of the message, but
the hash signature after adding the message to ZA. The ZA value includes the
SM3 hash of the following data, including some parameters and public keys of
ECC, and the USERID passed in by the user.
it also specified in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.
I didn't read the RFC draft yet, but I believe EVP_PKEY_sign should be
able to sign with any padding scheme (that's why we call
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md, for example, to tell how to encode
proper padding). Maybe you should ask OpenSSL people for suggestions?
Thanks,
Thanks for your suggestion, I got some information and will do it in the
next version of patch.
Best regards,
Tianjia
