On Thu, 2021-01-07 at 15:02 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Thu, 2021-01-07 at 08:42 -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > > On Thu, 2021-01-07 at 10:06 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > [Cc: Amir Goldstein] > > > > > > On Tue, 2021-01-05 at 11:57 -0800, Raphael Gianotti wrote: > > > > IMA measures files and buffer data and some systems may end up > > > > generating lots of entries in the IMA measurement list. This > > > > list is kept in kernel memoryc and as it grows in size it could > > > > end up taking too many resources, causing the system to run out > > > > of available memory. During kexec, the IMA measurement list can > > > > be carried over in memory, but it's possible for the list to > > > > become too large for that to happen. > > > > > > > > The Kconfig introduced in this series enables admins to > > > > configure a maximum number of entries and a file to export the > > > > IMA measurement list to whenever the set limit is reached. > > > > > > > > The list is written out in append mode, so the system will keep > > > > writing new entries as long as it stays running or runs out of > > > > space. Whenever the export file is set, it's truncated. If > > > > writing to the export list fails, a flag is set to prevent > > > > further exports, as the file is likely in a bad state. Setting > > > > a new export file resets this flag, allowing exports to resume > > > > and giving admins a way to recover from this state if > > > > necessary. > > > > > > > > In the case of kexec, if the list is too large too be carried > > > > over in memory and an export file is configured, the list will > > > > be exported, preventing the measurements from being lost during > > > > kexec. > > > > > > > > This code is based off of a previous RFC sent by Janne > > > > Karhunen[1], and is intended to pick up where that was left > > > > off. > > > > > > > > In a thread with Janne Karhunen[2], it was mentioned that > > > > another approach, using mm had been considered. Upon some > > > > investigation the approach used in this RFC still seemed > > > > adequate for solving this problem. > > > > > > > > [1] > > > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-integrity/patch/201912 > > > > 20074929.8191-1-janne.karhunen@xxxxxxxxx/ > > > > [2] > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/CAE=NcrbdS-3gVvnnEwdNSOLO > > > > vTenLjyppDz2aJACGRgBYSh=Gw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Raphael Gianotti <raphgi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > > > My original concerns of truncating the IMA measurement list have > > > not been addressed. Once the IMA measurement list has been > > > truncated, quoting and then verifying any of the PCRs contained > > > in the measurement list will fail, unless the measurements have > > > been preserved and are readily accessible. > > > > > > Amir's suggestion addresses kernel memory constraints without > > > truncating the IMA measurement list. > > > > What about having a log entry that's the current PCR value? Then > > stretches of the log starting with these entries would be > > independently verifiable provided you had a way of trusting the PCR > > value. It might be possible to get the TPM to add a signed quote > > as an optional part of the log entry (of course this brings other > > problems like which key do you use for the signing and how does it > > get verified) which would provide the trust and would definitively > > allow you to archive log segments and still make the rest of the > > log useful. > > The current PCR values are aggregated and stored in the > boot_aggregate record. As part of the new boot_aggregate record > format, the individual PCR values could be included. I don't think we care about the boot aggregate ... it's just the initial log entry that ties the boot state to the initial runtime state. All we need for the proposed entry is the current value of the IMA PCR so provided you trust that value it becomes a base on which the following measurements can build and be trusted. > But this doesn't address where the offloaded measurement list will be > stored, how long the list will be retained, nor who guarantees the > integrity of the offloaded list. In addition, different form factors > will have different requirements. I'm not sure you need any store at all. The basic idea is that the log is divided into individually verifiable segments. For auditing purposes you could keep all segments, so you have the entire log, but if you've acted on the prior log entries and you don't have an audit reason to keep them, you could erase that segment of the log because you've placed all your trust in the prior log segments into the PCR entry that forms the base of your current segment. Essentially the question devolves to what mechanisms can give you this trust in the base PCR log entry. James
