On Mon, 2020-06-29 at 20:47 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote: > > > I'm not if the "secure_boot" flag is available prior to calling > > default_appraise_setup(), but if it is, you could modify the test > > there to also check if the system is booted in secure boot mode (eg. > > IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM) && > > !arch_ima_get_secureboot()) > > > > Well pointed. I built a custom x86 kernel with some workaround to get > this flag status within default_appraise_setup() and as a result the > flag is was correctly available. > > Considering the nature of this flag (platform's firmware (in all > arches?)) can we trust that every arch supporting secure/trusted boot > will have it available in the __setup() call time? Calling default_appraise_setup() could be deferred. > > > > + /* In secure and/or trusted boot the appraisal must be > > > + * enforced, regardless kernel parameters, preventing > > > + * runtime changes */ > > > > Only "appraise" rules are enforced. > > > > Hmm.. do you mean the comment wording is wrong/"could be better", > pointing the "appraise" action explicitly? No, it's more than just the comment. Like "trusted boot", IMA- measurement only measures files, never enforces integrity. "ima_appraise" mode is only applicable to IMA-appraisal. Mimi
