On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 04:23:12PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Tue, 2020-06-23 at 17:26 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> <snip>
>
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index c1583d98c5e5..a760094e8f8d 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> > switch (id) {
> > case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
> > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
> > - && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > + && arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot()) {
> > pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
> > return -EACCES;
> > }
>
> Only IMA-appraisal enforces file integrity based on policy.
>
Right, but I didn't get the relation to the code above: I basically
renamed the function:
"arch_ima_get_secureboot" -> "arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot".
Which doesn't change the ima_load_data logic.
--
bmeneg
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