Quoting Joe Perches (joe@xxxxxxxxxxx): > Currently security files use a mixture of octal and symbolic styles > for permissions. > > Using octal and not symbolic permissions is preferred by many as more > readable. > > see: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/2/1945 Heh, well see also https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/2/2062 . Your patch definately improves readability, but will doubtless make backpointing future important patches more painful. > Prefer the direct use of octal for permissions. > > Done using: > > $ git ls-files security | \ > xargs ./scripts/checkpatch.pl -f --fix-inplace --types=symbolic_perms --strict > > and some typing. > > Before: $ git grep -P -w "0[0-7]{3,3}" security | wc -l > 53 > After: $ git grep -P -w "0[0-7]{3,3}" security | wc -l > 136 > > Miscellanea: > > o Whitespace neatening and line wrapping around these conversions. > o Remove now superfluous parentheses around direct use of 0600 > > Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 5 ++-- > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 23 ++++++++--------- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 +-- > security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 13 +++++----- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 +-- > security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 ++--- > security/smack/smackfs.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++----------------- > security/tomoyo/condition.c | 18 ++++++------- > 9 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c > index 949dd8a48164..c09dc0f3c3fe 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c > @@ -2426,10 +2426,9 @@ static int aa_mk_null_file(struct dentry *parent) > } > > inode->i_ino = get_next_ino(); > - inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO; > + inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | 0666; > inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode); > - init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, > - MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); > + init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | 0666, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); > d_instantiate(dentry, inode); > aa_null.dentry = dget(dentry); > aa_null.mnt = mntget(mount); > diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > index fbb08bc78bee..6759a70918de 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > @@ -1255,45 +1255,42 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); > /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ > enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; > module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, > - &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); > + &aa_g_profile_mode, 0600); > > /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */ > bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT); > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH > -module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); > +module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, 0600); > #endif > > /* Debug mode */ > bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES); > -module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); > +module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, 0600); > > /* Audit mode */ > enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; > -module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, > - &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); > +module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, &aa_g_audit, 0600); > > /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This > * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running > */ > bool aa_g_audit_header = true; > -module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, > - S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); > +module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, 0600); > > /* lock out loading/removal of policy > * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to > * load policy, if lock_policy is set > */ > bool aa_g_lock_policy; > -module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, > - S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); > +module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, 0600); > > /* Syscall logging mode */ > bool aa_g_logsyscall; > -module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); > +module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, 0600); > > /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ > unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; > -module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); > +module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, 0400); > > /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification > * on the loaded policy is done. > @@ -1301,11 +1298,11 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); > * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy. > */ > bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; > -module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); > +module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, 0444); > > /* Boot time disable flag */ > static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; > -module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO); > +module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, 0444); > > static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) > { > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index 354bb5716ce3..3f7707b8aaa7 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY > -#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR) > +#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS 0600 > #else > -#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS S_IWUSR > +#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS 0200 > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */ > > #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */ > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c > index ae9d5c766a3c..81700df83f51 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c > @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) > #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) > clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); > #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) > - inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR; > + inode->i_mode &= ~0200; > #endif > return 0; > } > @@ -465,28 +465,29 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) > > binary_runtime_measurements = > securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements", > - S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, > + 0440, ima_dir, NULL, > &ima_measurements_ops); > if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements)) > goto out; > > ascii_runtime_measurements = > securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements", > - S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, > + 0440, ima_dir, NULL, > &ima_ascii_measurements_ops); > if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements)) > goto out; > > runtime_measurements_count = > securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", > - S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, > + 0440, ima_dir, NULL, > &ima_measurements_count_ops); > if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count)) > goto out; > > violations = > - securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, > - ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops); > + securityfs_create_file("violations", > + 0440, ima_dir, NULL, > + &ima_htable_violations_ops); > if (IS_ERR(violations)) > goto out; > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index a85fac3345df..8ae043be8782 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -6336,9 +6336,9 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) > u32 av = 0; > > av = 0; > - if (flag & S_IRUGO) > + if (flag & 0444) > av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; > - if (flag & S_IWUGO) > + if (flag & 0222) > av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; > > if (av == 0) > diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c > index f3d374d2ca04..bfecac19ba92 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c > +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c > @@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) > goto out; > > ret = -ENOMEM; > - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR); > + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0644); > if (!inode) > goto out; > > @@ -1582,10 +1582,10 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir) > int i; > static const struct tree_descr files[] = { > { "cache_threshold", > - &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR }, > - { "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO }, > + &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, 0644 }, > + { "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, 0444 }, > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS > - { "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO }, > + { "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, 0444 }, > #endif > }; > > @@ -1643,7 +1643,7 @@ static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir) > if (!dentry) > return -ENOMEM; > > - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO); > + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444); > if (!inode) > return -ENOMEM; > > @@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue, > goto out; > > rc = -ENOMEM; > - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO); > + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444); > if (!inode) > goto out; > > @@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index, > if (!dentry) > return -ENOMEM; > > - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO); > + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444); > if (!inode) > return -ENOMEM; > > @@ -1870,7 +1870,7 @@ static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name, > if (!dentry) > return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > > - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); > + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | 0555); > if (!inode) { > dput(dentry); > return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > @@ -1899,25 +1899,24 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) > struct inode_security_struct *isec; > > static const struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = { > - [SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR}, > - [SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > - [SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, > - [SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, > - [SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, > - [SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, > - [SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, > - [SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, S_IRUGO}, > - [SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, S_IWUSR}, > - [SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, S_IRUGO}, > - [SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR}, > - [SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, > - [SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > - [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO}, > - [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO}, > - [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO}, > - [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO}, > - [SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops, > - S_IWUGO}, > + [SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, 0600}, > + [SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, 0644}, > + [SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, 0666}, > + [SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, 0666}, > + [SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, 0666}, > + [SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, 0666}, > + [SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, 0666}, > + [SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, 0444}, > + [SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, 0200}, > + [SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, 0444}, > + [SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, 0200}, > + [SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, 0666}, > + [SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, 0644}, > + [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, 0444}, > + [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, 0444}, > + [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, 0444}, > + [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, 0444}, > + [SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops, 0222}, > /* last one */ {""} > }; > > @@ -1943,7 +1942,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) > goto err; > > ret = -ENOMEM; > - inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO); > + inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | 0666); > if (!inode) > goto err; > > @@ -1953,7 +1952,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) > isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; > isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; > > - init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); > + init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | 0666, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); > d_add(dentry, inode); > > dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &fsi->last_ino); > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index dcb976f98df2..8953440c6559 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -2945,11 +2945,11 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags) > { > int may = 0; > > - if (flags & S_IRUGO) > + if (flags & 0444) > may |= MAY_READ; > - if (flags & S_IWUGO) > + if (flags & 0222) > may |= MAY_WRITE; > - if (flags & S_IXUGO) > + if (flags & 0111) > may |= MAY_EXEC; > > return may; > diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c > index f6482e53d55a..270cd3a308f0 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c > +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c > @@ -2857,55 +2857,53 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) > > static const struct tree_descr smack_files[] = { > [SMK_LOAD] = { > - "load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "load", &smk_load_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_CIPSO] = { > - "cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_DOI] = { > - "doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "doi", &smk_doi_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_DIRECT] = { > - "direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "direct", &smk_direct_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_AMBIENT] = { > - "ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_NET4ADDR] = { > - "netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_ONLYCAP] = { > - "onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_LOGGING] = { > - "logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "logging", &smk_logging_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_LOAD_SELF] = { > - "load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, > + "load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, 0666}, > [SMK_ACCESSES] = { > - "access", &smk_access_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, > + "access", &smk_access_ops, 0666}, > [SMK_MAPPED] = { > - "mapped", &smk_mapped_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "mapped", &smk_mapped_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_LOAD2] = { > - "load2", &smk_load2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "load2", &smk_load2_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_LOAD_SELF2] = { > - "load-self2", &smk_load_self2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, > + "load-self2", &smk_load_self2_ops, 0666}, > [SMK_ACCESS2] = { > - "access2", &smk_access2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, > + "access2", &smk_access2_ops, 0666}, > [SMK_CIPSO2] = { > - "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ] = { > - "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops, > - S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_CHANGE_RULE] = { > - "change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_SYSLOG] = { > - "syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, 0644}, > [SMK_PTRACE] = { > - "ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, 0644}, > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP > [SMK_UNCONFINED] = { > - "unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, 0644}, > #endif > #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) > [SMK_NET6ADDR] = { > - "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, > + "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, 0644}, > #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ > [SMK_RELABEL_SELF] = { > - "relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops, > - S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, > + "relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops, 0666}, > /* last one */ > {""} > }; > diff --git a/security/tomoyo/condition.c b/security/tomoyo/condition.c > index 8d0e1b9c9c57..2069f5912469 100644 > --- a/security/tomoyo/condition.c > +++ b/security/tomoyo/condition.c > @@ -874,31 +874,31 @@ bool tomoyo_condition(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, > value = S_ISVTX; > break; > case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_READ: > - value = S_IRUSR; > + value = 0400; > break; > case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_WRITE: > - value = S_IWUSR; > + value = 0200; > break; > case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_EXECUTE: > - value = S_IXUSR; > + value = 0100; > break; > case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_READ: > - value = S_IRGRP; > + value = 0040; > break; > case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_WRITE: > - value = S_IWGRP; > + value = 0020; > break; > case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_EXECUTE: > - value = S_IXGRP; > + value = 0010; > break; > case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_READ: > - value = S_IROTH; > + value = 0004; > break; > case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_WRITE: > - value = S_IWOTH; > + value = 0002; > break; > case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_EXECUTE: > - value = S_IXOTH; > + value = 0001; > break; > case TOMOYO_EXEC_ARGC: > if (!bprm) > -- > 2.15.0
