Re: [PATCH 8/8] ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions

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On 05/30/2018 05:22 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 9:08 AM, Stefan Berger
<stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 05/30/2018 08:49 AM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
On 2018-05-24 16:11, Stefan Berger wrote:
The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines
AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.

With this change we now call integrity_audit_msg_common() to get
common integrity auditing fields. This now produces the following
record when parsing an IMA policy rule:

type=UNKNOWN[1806] msg=audit(1527004216.690:311): action=dont_measure \
    fsmagic=0x9fa0 pid=1613 uid=0 auid=0 ses=2 \
    subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 \
    op=policy_update cause=parse_rule comm="echo" exe="/usr/bin/echo" \
    tty=tty2 res=1

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
   include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 +++--
   2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 4e61a9e05132..776e0abd35cf 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS            1802 /* Integrity enable
status */
   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH      1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR       1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
-#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE       1805 /* policy rule */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE       1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy
msgs  */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1806 /* IMA policy rules */
     #define AUDIT_KERNEL                2000    /* Asynchronous audit
record. NOT A REQUEST. */
   diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3aed25a7178a..a8ae47a386b4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct
ima_rule_entry *entry)
         int result = 0;
         ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
-                                      AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+                                      AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
Is it possible to connect this record to a syscall by replacing the
first parameter (NULL) by current->context?
We're likely going to need to "associate" this record (audit speak for
making the first parameter non-NULL) with others for the audit
container ID work.  If you do it now, Richard's patches will likely
get a few lines smaller and that will surely make him a bit happier :)

Richard is also introducing a local context that we can then create and use instead of the NULL. Can we not use that then?

Steven seems to say: "We don't want to add syscall records to everything. That messes up schemas and existing code. The integrity events are 1 record in size and should stay that way. This saves disk space and improves readability."



We would have to fix current->context in this case since it is NULL. We get
to this location by root cat'ing a policy or writing a policy filename into
/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy.
Perhaps I'm missing something, but current in this case should point
to the process which is writing to the policy file, yes?

Yes, but current->context is NULL for some reason.




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