On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 9:08 AM, Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 05/30/2018 08:49 AM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: >> >> On 2018-05-24 16:11, Stefan Berger wrote: >>> >>> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and >>> the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines >>> AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules. >>> >>> With this change we now call integrity_audit_msg_common() to get >>> common integrity auditing fields. This now produces the following >>> record when parsing an IMA policy rule: >>> >>> type=UNKNOWN[1806] msg=audit(1527004216.690:311): action=dont_measure \ >>> fsmagic=0x9fa0 pid=1613 uid=0 auid=0 ses=2 \ >>> subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 \ >>> op=policy_update cause=parse_rule comm="echo" exe="/usr/bin/echo" \ >>> tty=tty2 res=1 >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >>> --- >>> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 3 ++- >>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 +++-- >>> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >>> index 4e61a9e05132..776e0abd35cf 100644 >>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >>> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ >>> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS 1802 /* Integrity enable >>> status */ >>> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH 1803 /* Integrity HASH type */ >>> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */ >>> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */ >>> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy >>> msgs */ >>> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1806 /* IMA policy rules */ >>> #define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit >>> record. NOT A REQUEST. */ >>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >>> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >>> index 3aed25a7178a..a8ae47a386b4 100644 >>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >>> @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct >>> ima_rule_entry *entry) >>> int result = 0; >>> ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, >>> - AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); >>> + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE); >> >> Is it possible to connect this record to a syscall by replacing the >> first parameter (NULL) by current->context? We're likely going to need to "associate" this record (audit speak for making the first parameter non-NULL) with others for the audit container ID work. If you do it now, Richard's patches will likely get a few lines smaller and that will surely make him a bit happier :) > We would have to fix current->context in this case since it is NULL. We get > to this location by root cat'ing a policy or writing a policy filename into > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy. Perhaps I'm missing something, but current in this case should point to the process which is writing to the policy file, yes? -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com
