Re: RFC: Make it practical to ship EVM signatures

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On Mon, 2017-10-02 at 10:09 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 30, 2017 at 7:36 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Fri, 2017-09-29 at 13:09 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> >> If the security metadata is different then copying another
> >> security.evm will fail, surely?
> >
> > A copy of the file could exist with a valid hmac on the system with
> > different security xattrs.  Without the inode/uuid, the xattrs could
> > be cut & pasted.
> 
> So we have /usr/bin/a and /usr/bin/b, which are identical but have
> different security contexts. Outside some unusual cases, if I have the
> ability to modify /usr/bin/b's security.evm, I can delete /usr/bin/b.
> I can then also just do:
> 
> ln -f /usr/bin/a /usr/bin/b
> 
> and /usr/bin/b now has the same security context as /usr/bin/a,
> including security.evm.

All true, but instead of /usr/bin/a and /usr/bin/b, which most likely
have the same LSM labels, think of it in terms of /home/bin/b.  An
offline attack wouldn't require access to the EVM HMAC key or any
privileges.

Mimi




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