On Sat, 2016-07-09 at 00:20 +0800, Tom Yan wrote: > To be honest, that sounds like FUD to me. If argument is to be in acronyms, it's KISS. > The exact reason why this can "safely" be introduced to the SATL is > that, it is a "one-shot" command that would only be triggered by the > user through a user space utility. It's nothing like TRIM that would > be triggered by the filesystem layer or so "from time to time", which > might cost users "unexpected" data loss. It is also nothing like > SECURE ERASE (which vendors had to abuse to provide equivalence of > BLOCK ERASE and CRYPTOGRAPHIC ERASE for SSDs and drives that does > hardware encryption) that requires the drive to be locked before you > can issue an erase command. OK, since you ignore the argument about maintenance: safety for us means that it doesn't bitrot as an almost never used addition. The reason our SATL should only support the commands Linux uses is precisely because if it's used often we get immediate notice of when we break it. This maintenance burden means that adding stuff isn't free so we should have some utility bar before we do it. Just "because we can" doesn't seem to rise to that. > Certainly you can expect users to pack an ATA PASS-THROUGH command > themselves and issued it with sg_raw or so, or hdparm to be patched > to support the full feature set (including the "optional" > FREEZE/ANTIFREEZE sub-feature), but I don't see how these would be > reasons that the translation should not be introduced to the kernel, > so that we can make good use of its existing SATL infrastructure and > sg_sanitize. Or we could simply patch sg_sanitze to issue the ATA_16 pass through when it sees a sata device ... > Whether it is "secure" enough to use the implementation would be the > user's call. To be frank, saying that implementing it in the "SAT > -way" > would make it untrustable doesn't make any sense to me, especially > when the way the feature set works is considered. To be honest, I bet real security people won't even trust the drive firmware. Their answer will still be dd random patterns to prevent easy retrieval then crush the drive to prevent forensic retrieval. James > On 8 July 2016 at 00:47, James Bottomley > <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Fri, 2016-07-08 at 00:32 +0800, tom.ty89@xxxxxxxxx wrote: > > > From: Tom Yan <tom.ty89@xxxxxxxxx> > > > > > > With this patch, users can make use of the SANITIZE DEVICE > > > feature > > > set through utility like sg_sanitize. > > > > > > Support for BLOCK ERASE, CRYPTOGRAPHIC ERASE and EXIT FAILURE > > > MODE > > > has been implemented. Support for OVERWRITE that involves a > > > parameter list has been left out for now. > > > > > > Further support for command with IMMED bit set to zero, REQUEST > > > SENSE translation for user-space status polling, and support > > > checking in IDENTIFY DEVICE data log (return proper sense data > > > when designated method is not supported) should be implemented > > > in the future as well. > > > > > > `sg_sanitize -e -B|-C|-F /dev/sdX` should work fine with this. > > > > Why on earth would you want to do this? If your intent is to > > sanitise > > the disk using a cryptographic erase you presumably have a real > > security need for doing it and, knowing what goes into most SAT > > layers, > > I'd not really trust any SAT for this operation, so for an > > underlying > > SATA device I'd use ATA_16 to send a real ACS-2 SANITIZE command. > > > > Just as a general note about our SAT layer: Adding little used > > features > > is an invitation to bloat it with buggy implementations which makes > > it > > harder to understand and bug prone for odd and unlikely use cases, > > which then take ages to diagnose and track down. The only things > > which > > should be in the SAT is what the Linux SCSI subsystem would > > actually > > use. For everything else, if the user cares enough, they'll send > > down > > an encapsulated ATA command. > > > > James > > > > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-scsi" > in > the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-ide" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
