Re: [PATCH 3/5] x86/mm: Mark CoCo VM pages not present while changing encrypted state

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On 10/2/23 11:35, Tom Lendacky wrote:
On 9/29/23 13:19, Michael Kelley wrote:
In a CoCo VM when a page transitions from encrypted to decrypted, or vice
versa, attributes in the PTE must be updated *and* the hypervisor must
be notified of the change. Because there are two separate steps, there's
a window where the settings are inconsistent.  Normally the code that
initiates the transition (via set_memory_decrypted() or
set_memory_encrypted()) ensures that the memory is not being accessed
during a transition, so the window of inconsistency is not a problem.
However, the load_unaligned_zeropad() function can read arbitrary memory
pages at arbitrary times, which could access a transitioning page during
the window.  In such a case, CoCo VM specific exceptions are taken
(depending on the CoCo architecture in use).  Current code in those
exception handlers recovers and does "fixup" on the result returned by
load_unaligned_zeropad().  Unfortunately, this exception handling can't
work in paravisor scenarios (TDX Paritioning and SEV-SNP in vTOM mode).
The exceptions need to be forwarded from the paravisor to the Linux
guest, but there are no architectural specs for how to do that.

Fortunately, there's a simpler way to solve the problem by changing
the core transition code in __set_memory_enc_pgtable() to do the
following:

1.  Remove aliasing mappings
2.  Flush the data cache if needed
3.  Remove the PRESENT bit from the PTEs of all transitioning pages
4.  Set/clear the encryption attribute as appropriate
5.  Flush the TLB so the changed encryption attribute isn't visible
6.  Notify the hypervisor of the encryption status change

Not sure why I didn't notice this before, but I will need to test this to be certain. As part of this notification, the SNP support will issue a PVALIDATE instruction (to either validate or rescind validation to the page). PVALIDATE takes a virtual address. If the PRESENT bit has been removed, the PVALIDATE instruction will take a #PF (see comments below).

Yes, this series results in a #PF booting an SNP guest:

[    0.807735] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88803bef7000
[    0.807829] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[    0.807829] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[    0.807829] PGD 8000004c01067 P4D 8000004c01067 PUD 8000004c02067 PMD 80001001f8063 PTE 8007ffffc4108062
[    0.807829] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[    0.807829] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-sos-testing #1
[    0.807829] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
[    0.807829] RIP: 0010:pvalidate_pages+0x99/0x140
[    0.807829] Code: 48 09 ca 0f b6 4c c7 0f 48 09 d6 0f b6 54 c7 0e 48 c1 e6 0c 4c 21 de 83 e2 f0 80 fa 10 4a 8d 2c 16 0f 94 c2 48 89 e8 83 e1 01 <f2> 0f 01 ff 41 89 c4 72 6
1 83 f8 06 75 45 84 c9 74 41 48 01 de 48
[    0.807829] RSP: 0000:ffffffff82803bd0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[    0.807829] RAX: ffff88803bef7000 RBX: ffff888000200000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    0.807829] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bef7000 RDI: ffffffff82803c40
[    0.807829] RBP: ffff88803bef7000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[    0.807829] R10: ffff888000000000 R11: 000000ffffffffff R12: 0000000000000040
[    0.807829] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: ffffffff82803e48 R15: ffff88803bf37000
[    0.807829] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    0.807829] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    0.807829] CR2: ffff88803bef7000 CR3: 000800000382e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
[    0.807829] Call Trace:
[    0.807829]  <TASK>
[    0.807829]  ? __die+0x1f/0x70
[    0.807829]  ? page_fault_oops+0x81/0x150
[    0.807829]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[    0.807829]  ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x84/0x110
[    0.807829]  ? exc_page_fault+0xa8/0x150
[    0.807829]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[    0.807829]  ? pvalidate_pages+0x99/0x140
[    0.807829]  __set_pages_state+0x280/0x2b0
[    0.807829]  set_pages_state+0x4e/0xa0
[    0.807829]  amd_enc_status_change_finish+0x4a/0x80
[    0.807829]  __set_memory_enc_dec+0xe1/0x190
[    0.807829]  mem_encrypt_init+0x15/0xc0
[    0.807829]  start_kernel+0x31b/0x5e0
[    0.807829]  x86_64_start_reservations+0x14/0x30
[    0.807829]  x86_64_start_kernel+0x79/0x80
[    0.807829]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x16b/0x16b
[    0.807829]  </TASK>
[    0.807829] Modules linked in:
[    0.807829] CR2: ffff88803bef7000
[    0.807829] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    0.807829] RIP: 0010:pvalidate_pages+0x99/0x140
[    0.807829] Code: 48 09 ca 0f b6 4c c7 0f 48 09 d6 0f b6 54 c7 0e 48 c1 e6 0c 4c 21 de 83 e2 f0 80 fa 10 4a 8d 2c 16 0f 94 c2 48 89 e8 83 e1 01 <f2> 0f 01 ff 41 89 c4 72 6
1 83 f8 06 75 45 84 c9 74 41 48 01 de 48
[    0.807829] RSP: 0000:ffffffff82803bd0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[    0.807829] RAX: ffff88803bef7000 RBX: ffff888000200000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    0.807829] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bef7000 RDI: ffffffff82803c40
[    0.807829] RBP: ffff88803bef7000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[    0.807829] R10: ffff888000000000 R11: 000000ffffffffff R12: 0000000000000040
[    0.807829] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: ffffffff82803e48 R15: ffff88803bf37000
[    0.807829] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    0.807829] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    0.807829] CR2: ffff88803bef7000 CR3: 000800000382e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
[    0.807829] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[    0.807829] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---


Thanks,
Tom


7.  Add back the PRESENT bit, making the changed attribute visible

With this approach, load_unaligned_zeropad() just takes its normal
page-fault-based fixup path if it touches a page that is transitioning.
As a result, load_unaligned_zeropad() and CoCo VM page transitioning
are completely decoupled.  CoCo VM page transitions can proceed
without needing to handle architecture-specific exceptions and fix
things up. This decoupling reduces the complexity due to separate
TDX and SEV-SNP fixup paths, and gives more freedom to revise and
introduce new capabilities in future versions of the TDX and SEV-SNP
architectures. Paravisor scenarios work properly without needing
to forward exceptions.

With this approach, the order of updating the guest PTEs and
notifying the hypervisor doesn't matter. As such, only a single
hypervisor callback is needed, rather one before and one after
the PTE update. Simplify the code by eliminating the extra
hypervisor callback along with the TDX and SEV-SNP code that
handles the before and after cases. The TLB flush callback is
also no longer required and is removed.

Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
  arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c       | 66 +------------------------------------------
  arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c         |  6 ----
  arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c    |  4 ---
  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 27 ++++--------------
  arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c  | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
  5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index 3e6dbd2..1bb2fff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -676,24 +676,6 @@ bool tdx_handle_virt_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
      return true;
  }
-static bool tdx_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
-{
-    /*
-     * TDX guest is responsible for flushing TLB on private->shared
-     * transition. VMM is responsible for flushing on shared->private.
-     *
-     * The VMM _can't_ flush private addresses as it can't generate PAs
-     * with the guest's HKID.  Shared memory isn't subject to integrity
-     * checking, i.e. the VMM doesn't need to flush for its own protection.
-     *
-     * There's no need to flush when converting from shared to private,
-     * as flushing is the VMM's responsibility in this case, e.g. it must
-     * flush to avoid integrity failures in the face of a buggy or
-     * malicious guest.
-     */
-    return !private;
-}
-
  static bool tdx_cache_flush_required(void)
  {
      /*
@@ -776,30 +758,6 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)
      return true;
  }
-static bool tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
-                      bool enc)
-{
-    /*
-     * Only handle shared->private conversion here.
-     * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
-     */
-    if (enc)
-        return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
-    return true;
-}
-
-static bool tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
-                     bool enc)
-{
-    /*
-     * Only handle private->shared conversion here.
-     * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
-     */
-    if (!enc)
-        return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
-    return true;
-}
-
  void __init tdx_early_init(void)
  {
      struct tdx_module_args args = {
@@ -831,30 +789,8 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
       */
      physical_mask &= cc_mask - 1;
-    /*
-     * The kernel mapping should match the TDX metadata for the page.
-     * load_unaligned_zeropad() can touch memory *adjacent* to that which is
-     * owned by the caller and can catch even _momentary_ mismatches.  Bad
-     * things happen on mismatch:
-     *
-     *   - Private mapping => Shared Page  == Guest shutdown
-         *   - Shared mapping  => Private Page == Recoverable #VE
-     *
-     * guest.enc_status_change_prepare() converts the page from
-     * shared=>private before the mapping becomes private.
-     *
-     * guest.enc_status_change_finish() converts the page from
-     * private=>shared after the mapping becomes private.
-     *
-     * In both cases there is a temporary shared mapping to a private page, -     * which can result in a #VE.  But, there is never a private mapping to
-     * a shared page.
-     */
-    x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare = tdx_enc_status_change_prepare; -    x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish  = tdx_enc_status_change_finish;
-
+    x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish  = tdx_enc_status_changed;
      x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required  = tdx_cache_flush_required;
-    x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required    = tdx_tlb_flush_required;
      /*
       * TDX intercepts the RDMSR to read the X2APIC ID in the parallel
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
index 084fab6..fbe2585 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
@@ -550,11 +550,6 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bo
      return result;
  }
-static bool hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
-{
-    return true;
-}
-
  static bool hv_vtom_cache_flush_required(void)
  {
      return false;
@@ -614,7 +609,6 @@ void __init hv_vtom_init(void)
      x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio = hv_is_private_mmio;
      x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = hv_vtom_cache_flush_required; -    x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required;       x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = hv_vtom_set_host_visibility;
      /* Set WB as the default cache mode. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
index a37ebd3..cf5179b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
@@ -131,9 +131,7 @@ struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit = {
  static void default_nmi_init(void) { };
-static bool enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }   static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
-static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; }
  static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; }
  static bool is_private_mmio_noop(u64 addr) {return false; }
@@ -154,9 +152,7 @@ struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = {
      .hyper.is_private_mmio        = is_private_mmio_noop,
      .guest = {
-        .enc_status_change_prepare = enc_status_change_prepare_noop,
          .enc_status_change_finish  = enc_status_change_finish_noop,
-        .enc_tlb_flush_required       = enc_tlb_flush_required_noop,
          .enc_cache_flush_required  = enc_cache_flush_required_noop,
      },
  };
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index 6faea41..06960ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -278,11 +278,6 @@ static unsigned long pg_level_to_pfn(int level, pte_t *kpte, pgprot_t *ret_prot)
      return pfn;
  }
-static bool amd_enc_tlb_flush_required(bool enc)
-{
-    return true;
-}
-
  static bool amd_enc_cache_flush_required(void)
  {
      return !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT);
@@ -318,18 +313,6 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size, bool enc)
  #endif
  }
-static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
-{
-    /*
-     * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
-     * to invalidate the memory before encryption attribute is cleared.
-     */
-    if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && !enc)
-        snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages);
-
-    return true;
-}
-
  /* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */   static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
  {
@@ -337,8 +320,12 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool e
       * After memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it
       * so that it is consistent with the page table updates.
       */
-    if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && enc)
-        snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, npages);
+    if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) {
+        if (enc)
+            snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, npages);
+        else
+            snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages);
+    }

These calls will both result in a PVALIDATE being issued (either before or after the page state change to the hypervisor) using the virtual address, which will trigger a #PF is the present bit isn't set.

      if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
          enc_dec_hypercall(vaddr, npages << PAGE_SHIFT, enc);
@@ -498,9 +485,7 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
      /* Update the protection map with memory encryption mask */
      add_encrypt_protection_map();
-    x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare = amd_enc_status_change_prepare;       x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish  = amd_enc_status_change_finish; -    x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required    = amd_enc_tlb_flush_required;       x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required  = amd_enc_cache_flush_required;
      /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index d7ef8d3..d062e01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -2147,40 +2147,57 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
      memset(&cpa, 0, sizeof(cpa));
      cpa.vaddr = &addr;
      cpa.numpages = numpages;
+
+    /*
+     * The caller must ensure that the memory being transitioned between
+     * encrypted and decrypted is not being accessed.  But if
+     * load_unaligned_zeropad() touches the "next" page, it may generate a
+     * read access the caller has no control over. To ensure such accesses
+     * cause a normal page fault for the load_unaligned_zeropad() handler,
+     * mark the pages not present until the transition is complete.  We
+     * don't want a #VE or #VC fault due to a mismatch in the memory
+     * encryption status, since paravisor configurations can't cleanly do
+     * the load_unaligned_zeropad() handling in the paravisor.
+     *
+     * There's no requirement to do so, but for efficiency we can clear
+     * _PAGE_PRESENT and set/clr encryption attr as a single operation.
+     */
      cpa.mask_set = enc ? pgprot_encrypted(empty) : pgprot_decrypted(empty); -    cpa.mask_clr = enc ? pgprot_decrypted(empty) : pgprot_encrypted(empty);
+    cpa.mask_clr = enc ? pgprot_decrypted(__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT)) :
+                pgprot_encrypted(__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT));

This should be lined up with the pgprot_decrypted above, e.g.:

cpa.mask_clr = enc ? pgprot_decrypted(__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT)) :
              pgprot_encrypted(__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT));

or

cpa.mask_clr = enc ? pgprot_decrypted(__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT))
            : pgprot_encrypted(__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT));

      cpa.pgd = init_mm.pgd;
      /* Must avoid aliasing mappings in the highmem code */
      kmap_flush_unused();
      vm_unmap_aliases();
-    /* Flush the caches as needed before changing the encryption attribute. */
-    if (x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required(enc))
-        cpa_flush(&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required());
-
-    /* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */ -    if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc))
-        return -EIO;
+    /* Flush the caches as needed before changing the encryption attr. */
+    if (x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required())
+        cpa_flush(&cpa, 1);
      ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
      /*
-     * After changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush TLBs again
-     * in case any speculative TLB caching occurred (but no need to flush
-     * caches again).  We could just use cpa_flush_all(), but in case TLB
-     * flushing gets optimized in the cpa_flush() path use the same logic
-     * as above.
+     * After clearing _PAGE_PRESENT and changing the encryption attribute,
+     * we need to flush TLBs to ensure no further accesses to the memory can +     * be made with the old encryption attribute (but no need to flush caches +     * again).  We could just use cpa_flush_all(), but in case TLB flushing
+     * gets optimized in the cpa_flush() path use the same logic as above.
       */
      cpa_flush(&cpa, 0);
-    /* Notify hypervisor that we have successfully set/clr encryption attribute. */
-    if (!ret) {
-        if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc))
-            ret = -EIO;
-    }
+    /* Notify hypervisor that we have successfully set/clr encryption attr. */
+    if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc))
+        return -EIO;

Here's where the #PF is likely to be triggered.

Thanks,
Tom

-    return ret;
+    /*
+     * Now that the hypervisor is sync'ed with the page table changes
+     * made here, add back _PAGE_PRESENT. set_memory_p() does not flush
+     * the TLB.
+     */
+    return set_memory_p(&addr, numpages);
  }
  static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)




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