Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> On 08/26, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>
>> Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>
>> > proc_fd_permission() says "process can still access /proc/self/fd
>> > after it has executed a setuid()", but the "task_pid() = proc_pid()
>> > check only helps if the task is group leader, /proc/self points to
>> > /proc/leader-pid.
>> >
>> > Change this check to use task_tgid() so that the whole process can
>> > access /proc/self/fd.
>>
>> There is at least a semantic goofiness here.
>>
>> There is /proc/<tgid>/fd and /proc/<tgid>/task/<pid>/fd, and the same
>> permission check is used by both.
>
> Yes, and we have /proc/<tid>/ which includes fd as well.
>
>> We might just want to have a /proc/thread symlink as well so people
>> don't have this issue.
>
> Yes! I agree.
>
> In particular, from the changelog:
>
> Note: CLONE_THREAD doesn't require CLONE_FILES so task->files can
> differ,
>
> so /proc/self/fd doesn't necessarily mean current->files, this can confuse
> the application.
>
> And I also assume that you agree with this change ;)
I don't disagree. Comparing tgid to pids is goofy and my brain is
elsewhere so I have no thought through the implications.
Actually thinking I think the check should really be. In which case we
are comparing what we really care about.
int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
int rv = generic_permission(inode, mask);
if (rv == 0)
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
struct task *task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode));
if (task && (current->files == task->files))
rv = 0;
rcu_read_unlock();
return rv;
}
Eric
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
