On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 12:48 PM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Or pid_revalidate(), but my concern is task_dumpable() logic.
>
> pid_revalidate() does inode->i_*id = GLOBAL_ROOT_*ID if task_dumpable()
> fails, but it can fail simply because ->mm = NULL.
>
> This means that almost everything in /proc/zombie-pid/ becomes root.
> Doesn't really hurt, but for what? Looks a bit strange imho.
The zombie case shouldn't be relevant, because a zombie will have
closed all the file descriptors anyway, so they no longer exist.
That said, task_dumpable isn't wonderful, and I suspect we could drop
that logic entirely in the tid-fd case if we just use f_cred.
The reason we have task_dumpable is exactly because we use the task
credentials, and they may not really be relevant to the file
credentials. IOW, it's there to protect against execve'ing a suid
program that opens some protected file and then in setuid()'s back the
the original user after having done the critical stuff. But
file->f_cred is exactly about the credentials at the time of the open,
so it should make things like that irrelevant.
Linus
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