On Sat, Aug 24, 2013 at 8:37 PM, Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 02:07:26AM +0100, Al Viro wrote: >> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 01:54:15PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: >> > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 1:48 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > > >> > > Sure. But aren't they always last? >> > >> > What do you mean? I'd say that the /proc lookup is always *innermost*. >> > Which means that it certainly cannot bail out, since there are many >> > levels of nesting outside of it. >> > >> > > With the current code structure, trying to enforce some kind of >> > > security restriction in the middle of lookup seems really unpleasant. >> > >> > If it's conditional (ie "linkat behaves differently from openat"), it >> > certainly means that we'd have to pass in that info in annoying ways. >> >> Nope. All we need to pass is one more LOOKUP_... Add >> if (unlikely(nd->last_type == LAST_BIND)) { >> if ((nd->flags & LOOKUP_BLAH) && !may_flink(...)) { >> terminate_walk(nd); >> return -EINVAL; >> } >> } >> in the beginning of lookup_last() and pass LOOKUP_BLAH in flags when >> linkat() calls user_path_at(). That will affect *only* the terminal >> symlinks and cost nothing in all normal cases. The same check can >> bloody well go into path_init() - take >> if (*name) { >> if (!can_lookup(dentry->d_inode)) { >> fdput(f); >> return -ENOTDIR; >> } >> } >> in there and slap >> else { >> if ((flags & LOOKUP_BLAH) && !may_flink(...)) { >> fdput(f); >> return -EINVAL; >> } >> } >> after it. > > OK, let me summarize these threads so far: > * restrictions for flink() are needed and they'd better be > consistent for AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW + /proc/<pid>/fd/<n> and simply > passing the descriptor as dfd. > * CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE is sufficient; so should be O_TMPFILE used > to open that sucker. > * lookup_last() is the natural place for catching the case > of following a trailing procfs symlink - it can be done very cheaply > there. > > FWIW, I'm tempted to try the following trick: > * introduce FMODE_FLINK in file->f_mode; O_TMPFILE would set it, > unless O_EXCL is present. > * introduce LOOKUP_LINK, to be passed by sys_linkat() when > resolving the target. > * have path_init() called with empty pathname and LOOKUP_LINK in > flags do checks for FMODE_FLINK or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE > * have ->proc_get_link() report whether the target is linkable > (either as bool * or by returning 1 instead of 0). After the call of > ->proc_get_link() check that and set nd->last_type to LAST_BIND_LINKABLE. > Note that *all* places looking at ->last_type treat LAST_BIND as "none > of the above" - we never compare with it, so splitting it in two wouldn't > break anything. > * have lookup_last() check if LOOKUP_LINK is present and ->last_type > is LAST_BIND; fail unless we have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. > > AFAICS, it gets more or less sane behaviour; additionally, it makes possible > to introduce explicit "I want that descriptor to be suitable for flink()" > open(2) flag - that would require teaching do_last() about LOOKUP_LINK, > making it check for CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE if it sees LAST_BIND / LOOKUP_LINK, > same as lookup_last() above (we obviously want to avoid the possibility > to take a non-flinkable descriptor and use it to reopen the sucker in > flinkable way). > > Alternatively we can revert "fs: Allow unprivileged linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) > aka flink" for the time being. flink() is certainly an awful mess and I > seriously regret touching it ;-/ > > Comments? Hell, maybe somebody even has printable ones - stranger things > have happened... I think this is more screwed up than just flink and open. For example: $ echo 'WTF' >test $ truncate -s 1 /proc/self/fd/3 3<test $ cat test W$ IMO that should have failed. In an ideal world (I think) ffrob(N), frobat(N, "", AT_EMPTY_PATH), and frobat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/fd/N) should generally do the same thing. This includes flink (even though the flink variant doesn't exist). open is a bit special. Of course, we're rather inconsistent with AT_EMPTY_PATH. utimensat accepts a null filename instead of a blank filename, and it doesn't appear to check the file mode at all. Sigh. --Andy -- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html