On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 14:10 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 1:58 PM, Colin Walters <walters@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 08:17 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > >> Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. If no_new_privs, > >> then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot. > > > > Is this needed/desired by anyone now, or are you just using it to "demo" > > NO_NEW_PRIVS? I don't see it as very useful on its own, since in any > > "container"-type chroot you really want /proc and /dev, and your patch > > doesn't help with that. > > It's a demo, but it could still be useful for container-ish things. > If something privileged sets up /proc, /sys, and /dev, then > unprivileged code can chroot into the container. This would allow > much simpler implementations of tools like schroot. What's the win if you still need a setuid binary? schroot (and my linux-user chroot binary) can just as easily call chroot as they can create bind mounts; I'm not buying a code complexity argument. > With this change, they wouldn't need to start privileged. > (Admittedly, this isn't a great argument for this patch.) Right...I'm not aware of anyone who would find that useful. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
